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IN DEFENSE OF THE FINALITY
OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES ON COLLATERAL REVIEW

RYAN W. SCOTTt
I.

INTRODUCTION

in Miller v. Alabama' has
decision
Court's
Supreme
he
touched
off a flurry of public debate and legislative action
around a seemingly dry and technical topic: the retroactivity of
new rules of sentencing procedure.' In Miller, the Court held that
sentencing a juvenile offender to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment if that
sentence is mandatory, rather than the product of a discretionary
choice.3 That rule prohibits mandatory life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile offenders in all pending and future cases.
But what about the more than two thousand juvenile murderers
who received a mandatory sentence of life without parole years
ago, before the Miller decision?" By filing a motion for collateral
review of the judgment, many prisoners have already asked state or
federal courts to apply Miller retroactively, vacating their sentences
and ordering new sentencing proceedings. So far the results have
been mixed. Many courts have declined to apply Miller to
sentences that became final before the rule was announced, citing
the government's interest in the finality of the judgment.
Although Miller has attracted considerable public
attention, that result is commonplace in the collateral review of
final criminal judgments. Congress and the courts have cited the
government's interest in finality as a basis for many barriers to
collateral relief, including statutes of limitations, harmless-error

T

t Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Bloomington.
Thanks to Caleb Phillips and Michael Trescone for valuable research assistance.
1. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. See Editorial,Injusticesfor Young Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, http://ww
w.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/opinion/end-mandatory-life-sentences.html.
3. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469-71.
4. See id. at 2477-78 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the number of prisoners
affected by the mandatory sentence).
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standards, and procedural default rules.5 The non-retroactivity of
"new constitutional rules" of criminal procedure,6 in particular, is
grounded principally in respect for the finality of criminal
judgments. Once the process of direct review has concluded and a
prisoner's conviction and sentence become final, a collateral
attack on the judgment faces a steep uphill battle based, in part,
on concerns about finality.
Recent scholarship, however, has challenged the strength
of those finality interests in cases where a collateral attack seeks
only to alter a criminal sentence without affecting the underlying
conviction. Sarah French Russell and Douglas Berman have
forcefully argued that interests in the finality of sentences on the
whole are considerably weaker than interests in the finality of
convictions.' Other judges and scholars have made more narrow
claims about the finality interests that attend particular cases or
particular claims of sentencing error. Federal courts of appeals on
occasion have drawn a similar distinction when calibrating
standards of review or levels of scrutiny.9 Their central claim is that
the collateral review of sentences, as opposed to convictions,
should be subject to different and less exacting rules. In
particular, they urge a more generous approach to retroactivity,
arguing that new rules of constitutional procedure that affect
sentencing should more readily apply to prisoners whose criminal
judgments have become final.10

5. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion).
6. Id. at 316.
7. See Douglas Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 4
WAKE FORESTJ.L. & POL'Y 151, 165-76 (2014) [hereinafter Berman, Finalityfor Sentences];
Douglas Berman, Distinguishing Finality Interests Between Convictions and Sentences,
SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Dec. 15, 2006, 9:51 AM), http://www.sentencing.typepad.c
om/sentencing law and policy/2006/12/distinguishing html
[hereinafter Berman,
Distinguishing Finality]; see also Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts,
Congress, and CollateralReview, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 88-89 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 901 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting) (discussing the sentences of two individual offenders with
unique circumstances because of the sentencing judge's actions); Paul J. Heald,
Retroactivity, Capital Sentencing, and the jurisdictionalContours of Habeas Corpus, 42 ALA. L.
REV. 1273, 1320-21 (1991) (discussing the narrow approach with respect to capital
sentences); Russell, supra note 7, at 85-86 (discussing "'Begay-type' errors" in which
courts erroneously classified prior convictions as "violent felon [ies]" that trigger sentence
enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act).
9. See infra pp. 196-97 and notes 90-95.
10. Id.
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The argument has obvious appeal in cases like Miller, in
which a class of juvenile offenders stands to serve out especially
severe sentences, despite the fact that they were imposed
unconstitutionally. It also has some force in light of the traditional
justifications for respecting finality. Resentencing is faster, less
complex, and cheaper than a new trial. Although resentencing
may take place years after the original proceedings, the relaxed
evidentiary rules at resentencing make the risk of inaccuracy from
unavailable or spoiled evidence less acute than at retrial. Indeed,
the passage of time may provide better information about the
offender's dangerousness and rehabilitation, enhancing accuracy.
In addition, continuing litigation over a sentence may not pose
the same threat to the reputation of the criminal justice system as
continuing litigation over guilt or innocence. Sentences are
already subject to modification and reduction through a host of
procedures, and the finality of a sentence currently being served
somehow "feels different" than a final conviction based on past
criminal conduct." Each of those distinctions, moreover, is
especially sharp for certain types of sentences or claims of
sentencing error, where resentencing would reap clear benefits
with few costs.
Nonetheless, this essay argues in defense of the finality of
criminal sentences on collateral review. It disentangles two
versions of the argument against sentence finality: a "strong
form," which insists that all sentences implicate diminished finality
interests; and a "modest form," which singles out particular types
of sentencing error and individual cases that pose a lesser threat to
finality. Neither version is persuasive, however, as a basis for
changing the rules for collateral review.
The strong form of the argument is premised on the low
costs of resentencing relative to retrial. But the focus on average
costs per procedure ignores a stark imbalance in the volume of
procedures: roughly ninety-five percent of criminal convictions
result from guilty pleas rather than trials, 2 and in those cases
sentencing represents the major investment of judicial resources.
New rules of sentencing procedure therefore threaten to disrupt
far more cases than new rules of trial procedure. As to accuracy,
sentencing, no less than trial, depends on a host of backward11.
12.

Berman, Finalityfor Sentences, supra note 7, at 167-69.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
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looking factual determinations-such as the severity of the
offense, the harm to victims, and the blameworthiness of the
offender-that may be difficult to replicate many years later.
Although new information may come to light that can benefit the
sentencing process, that is an argument for discretionary sentence
modification, and a non sequitur from a demand for resentencing
based on a new procedural rule. Nor is the finality of sentences
less important to the reputation of the criminal justice system. The
"truth in sentencing" movement, which has led to the abolition of
parole and other reforms in many jurisdictions, tapped into strong
public appetite for predictability in sentences. Outrage over
prisoners who commit crimes following early discharge also belies
the suggestion that the public is indifferent to sentences so long as
convictions remain intact.
The modest form of the argument focuses on particular
sentences and errors that pose a lesser threat to finality interests.
Violations of some sentencing rules, such as Miller's ban on
mandatory juvenile life-without-parole sentences, could be
corrected at a lower cost and with fewer concerns about accuracy
than others. By conducting a case-by-case balancing of finality and
competing interests, the argument goes, courts could develop
collateral review rules carefully calibrated to the particular
challenge. Yet some claims of trial error likewise implicate lesser
finality interests than others, and the same rules for collateral
review apply. The same is true in analogous settings, such as
qualified immunity for executive officials, where the Supreme
Court has adopted a unified standard rather than one that is
variable and context-specific." The equivalence in finality between
sentences and convictions under current law results not from
courts' special hostility to sentencing claims-their "finality
fixation," on Professor Berman's account 14 -but from a general
commitment to striking a single reasonable balance across the
board, rather than revisiting it in every new case. A case-by-case
balancing approach to sentence finality would be challenging for
collateral review courts because they rarely have complete

13. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); see also discussion infra Part IV.
14. See Douglas Berman, Fascinationand Frustrationwith "FinalityFixation" in en banc
Sixth Circuit Blewett Arguments, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.
sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing law and-policy/2013/10/fascination-and-frustrati
on-mix-as-i-worry-sixth-circuit-may-blow-it-in-blewett.html.
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information about what would happen at resentencing.
Doctrinally, it would also prove exceedingly complex, layering
standards upon standards and producing results that suffer from
the appearance, and probably the reality, of arbitrariness.
Widespread criticism of the rule-by-rule approach to retroactivity
under Linkletter v. Walker," long since abandoned by the Court,
should serve as a cautionary tale. A complex and unpredictable
sliding-scale approach to finality would also disserve the deterrent
purpose of collateral review.
More promising than a two-tier system in which all
sentencing challenges are subject to relaxed collateral review
rules, or case-by-case balancing in which courts make precise
doctrinal adjustments, is an approach that carves out broad
categories of sentences for distinct treatment on collateral review.
Capital sentences and federal sentences, for example, arguably
should be subject to different rules because they implicate
countervailing interests that justify a different balance against
finality. A categorical approach would add some complexity, but
would avoid the grave workability challenges of case-by-case
balancing. Sentences of life without parole, at issue in Miller,
would be a strong candidate under this approach.
Fixating on collateral review in debating the retroactivity of
Miller would be unfortunate. Many states, in responding to Miller,
have deliberately chosen to make their legislation retroactive.1 6
Considering the range of possible Miller "fixes," each carrying
different costs and producing different winners and losers,
legislatures are better situated than courts to select the best
option. In addition, because state courts can hardly be faulted for
failing to anticipate the rule of Miller, automatic resentencing in
cases where the government did not comply with the rule would
serve no deterrent purpose. At the same time, for a host of reasons
unrelated to retroactivity, collateral review is unreliable as a means
of giving effect to new rules of sentencing procedure. Critics of
finality in sentencing offer persuasive reasons to allow courts to
modify sentences, and juvenile offenders serving sentences of life
without parole deserve an opportunity for resentencing or parole

15. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
16. See Editorial, supra note 2 (noting that "[c]ourts in Michigan, Iowa, and
Mississippi have ruled that the ban applies to previously sentenced juveniles").
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eligibility. Given its purposes and limitations, however, collateral
review is not an appropriate or effective mechanism.
The essay proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the
current framework for finality on collateral review, setting out the
traditional rationales for the government's interests in finality and
explaining how current law operationalizes those interests in the
collateral review of criminal judgments. Part III engages the strong
form of the argument against sentence finality, discussing how
each of the traditional rationales for finality maps onto challenges
to sentences, as opposed to convictions, and whether those
differences justify a two-tier retroactivity regime. Part IV turns to
the modest form of the argument against sentence finality,
considering whether the diminished interests in finality that
attend particular sentences or types of sentences justify more
targeted changes to retroactivity law.
II. FINALITY ON COLLATERAL REVIEW: THE CURRENT
FRAMEWORK

Current law governing the collateral review of criminal
judgments accords strong respect to the government's interest in
finality. In this context, finality refers to several core concernscosts, inaccuracy, and reputational damage-about the relitigation
of criminal cases after a judgment becomes final. Those concerns
animate various doctrinal hurdles to collateral relief, including the
non-retroactivity of new rules of constitutional procedure. At
present, federal law does not draw any distinction for finality
purposes between convictions and sentences, as illustrated by
federal and state courts' decisions on the retroactivity of the
Supreme Court's decision in Miller.
A. Finality Interests on CollateralReview

In the context of collateral review," finality refers to the
interests of states and the federal government in preserving a

17. Finality may carry other meanings in criminal cases. For example, courts and
scholars sometimes refer to the "finality" of the death penalty, meaning that it cannot be
reversed. See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) (calling the death penalty
"unique in both its severity and its finality"). Similarly, in double jeopardy cases, courts
frequently emphasize the criminal defendant's interest in the "finality" of an acquittal.
See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978). This essay focuses on a different kind of
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criminal judgment. Once a criminal defendant has been convicted
and sentenced by a trial court, and the process of direct review on
appeal has concluded, the judgment is considered final.18
According to the prevailing view, championed in influential
opinions and articles by Justice John Marshall Harlan, Judge
Henry Friendly, and scholars like Paul Bator, Anthony Amsterdam,
and Paul Mishkin,19 the government has a strong interest in
preserving such a judgment, grounded primarily in three practical
considerations: the costs of relitigation, the accuracy of new
proceedings, and the damage to the reputation of the criminal
justice system.
First, collateral review of a criminal judgment is costly, time
consuming, and duplicative.20 Criminal trials require a substantial
investment of money and time, not only by the courts themselves,
but by prosecutors, defendants and their counsel, investigators,
witnesses, and jurors.2 ' Almost all of those costs are borne by the
public.2 2 A collateral attack on a conviction, if successful, forces
the adjudication process to start over from square one,
necessitating another substantial investment of resources. Those
costs may be particularly wasteful because, at least in theory, trial
courts and the direct review process already afford every
finality: the government's interest in certainty and repose following a final conviction and
sentence.
18. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 886-87 (1983) (holding that "a presumption of
finality and legality" attaches to a final criminal judgment).
19. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 688-89 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-64 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A
Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 383-84 (1963); Paul M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw
and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451-52 (1963); Henry
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminaljudgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
142, 146-51 (1970); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due
Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 77-86 (1965).
20. See Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 383-84 (describing "aspects of a 'finality'
factor" that include "duplication of judicial effort" and "delay in setting the criminal
proceeding at rest"); Bator, supra note 19, at 451 (discussing the costs of duplicative
relitigation).
21. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 946-47 (1983) (estimating
cost savings for courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel through guilty pleas rather than
trials); Friendly, supra note 19, at 148-49.
22. See ELI BRAUN, OHIO JUST. & POL'Y CENTER, $42,000 FOR A COURTHOUSE HOUR:
THE COST OF PROCESSING ADULT CRIMINAL CASES IN HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO (Sept. 1,

2010), availableat http://www.ohiojpc.org/text/publications/court%20cost.pdf (discussing "the burden of court functions on taxpayers").
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defendant a full and fair opportunity to defend against the
charges and to raise claims of error.2 3 As a result, collateral review
may be both expensive and duplicative. Respect for finality helps
to conserve the scarce public resources available to the criminal
justice system. 24
Second, because collateral review may take place years after
the original judgment became final, it may produce less accurate
results.25 The average time period between conviction and the
filing of a federal habeas petition by a state court prisoner is 6.3
years.26 It takes the federal courts another 9.4 months, on average,
to resolve the petition,27 and if relief is granted it takes still more
time for the prosecution, defense, and the state courts to
commence a new trial. That long time lag can jeopardize the
reliability of the new proceedings. Over time, memories fade,
evidence spoils, and witnesses die or otherwise become
unavailable.28 That poses challenges, in the first instance, for
collateral-review courts themselves. Evidence of what transpired at
trial may be stale, making it difficult to assess whether an error
occurred or how it affected the trial. That risk is particularly acute
when prisoners invoke "new rules" not yet announced at the time
the conviction became final, since no one might have paid
attention to the relevant facts during the original proceedings. 29 it
23. If the trial court failed to provide a full and fair opportunity to raise errors in the
first instance, some procedural obstacles to collateral relief are cleared away. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (2006) (waiving exhaustion requirements in cases where "there is an
absence of available State corrective process" or "circumstances exist that render such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant").
24. Friendly, supra note 19, at 148-49.
25. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (describing how a new trial
"prejudice [s] the government and dimish [es] the chances of a reliable criminal
adjudication"); Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (describing how witnesses' memories may be "dimmed"
during a second trial); Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 384 (arguing that relitigation "will
often be less reliable in reproducing the facts").
26. NANCYJ. KING ET AL., NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 22 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.g ov

/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf. The median period between conviction and filing of a
habeas petition is 5.7 years. Id.
27. Id. at 41.
28. Kirk J. Henderson, Thanks But No Thanks: State Supreme Courts'Attempts to Remove
Themselves from the FederalHabeas Exhaustion Requirement, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 201, 226
(2000).
29. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1815 (1991); Joseph Hoffmann,
Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 BYU L.
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also poses challenges for the trial court, if collateral review results
in an order to conduct a new trial. The second time around,
perhaps many years later, key evidence may be missing or less
reliable, rendering the new trial less accurate or even impossible.3 0
Similar concerns about accuracy, and in particular the risk of
prejudice resulting from long delays between a crime and the
ensuing trial, are central to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a
speedy trial.31
Third, collateral review threatens the public reputation of
the criminal justice system. Without some visible and conclusive
resolution to cases, a system of criminal justice lacks legitimacy.3 2
In Justice Harlan's memorable phrase: "No one, not criminal
defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is
benefited by ajudgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail
today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued
incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already
resolved."33 Scholars and judges who articulate this reputational
concern typically focus on the public, warning that frequent
relitigation of settled cases will undermine public confidence in
the criminal justice system. Variations of that concern, however,
focus on offenders and would-be offenders, maintaining that

REV. 183, 203 (1990) ("If successful on habeas, the petitioners who file such petitions are
the most difficult ones for state officials to retry because their cases are the most stale.").
30. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (noting "the enormous
burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the
States").
31. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1971) (calling "the possibility that
the defense will be impaired," due to loss of witnesses or faded memories, "the most
serious" interest that the Speedy Trial Clause was designed to protect because delays may
skew[] the fairness of the entire system").
32. Bator, supra note 19, at 452 ("A procedural system which permits an endless
repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a
lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the
effectiveness of the underlying substantive commands."); Friendly, supra note 19, at 149
(noting that "the human desire that things must sometime come to an end" is satisfied by
finality).
33. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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finality is essential to the deterrent effect of the criminal law,34 or
to the effective rehabilitation of offenders. 5
No one contends, of course, that finality interests outweigh
all other considerations. Despite the fact that it unsettles final
judgments, collateral review performs important functions,
including the vindication of federal rights in a federal forum, the
deterrence of constitutional errors, and the freeing of the
innocent.36 Nonetheless, based on concerns about cost, accuracy,
and reputation, the Supreme Court and many scholars have
concluded that finality interests are important enough to justify
some limits on the availability of collateral review.
B. Finality and the Retroactive Application of New Rules

Many limits on the collateral review of criminal judgments
derive from concerns about finality. Statutes of limitations, such as
the one-year limitation period for habeas corpus petitions by state
prisoners, obviously safeguard the repose of final criminal
judgments.' Restrictions on the filing of successive or abusive
habeas petitions likewise reflect concerns about finality.38 So do
rules excluding some constitutional claims altogether from
collateral proceedings, 39 harmless-error standards, 40 and a variety
of others.
Most relevant for present purposes, finality interests lie at
the heart of the Supreme Court's approach to retroactivity in

34. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Without
finality, the criminal law is deprived much of its deterrent effect.").
35. See Bator, supra note 19, at 452 ([W]e should at least tentatively inquire whether
an endless reopening of convictions . . . [would] be consistent with the aim of
rehabilitating offenders.").
36. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1813-15 (discussing each of those
functions).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1) (2006); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity,
Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 443, 453 (2007) ("The statute of limitations is
AEDPA's clearest expression of a finality interest, placing a temporal constraint on the
ability of prisoners to challenge convictions.").
38. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1991); Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491, n.31 (1976) (citing finality concerns in
support of a rule excluding Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims from the scope
of habeas corpus relief).
40. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635-36 (1993) (discussing finality
concerns in announcing a harmless-error standard for habeas review).
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habeas cases. In Teague v. Lane41 in 1989, the Court inaugurated its
current approach to cases in which a habeas petitioner seeks to
benefit retroactively from a "new rule" of criminal procedure,
announced after his conviction and sentence became final.42
Earlier that decade the Court had concluded that when a new rule
is announced, courts must give full retroactive application of the
rule in any cases still pending on direct review. 43 But in Teague the
Court held that, with limited exceptions, new rules should not
have retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.44 When a new
rule calls into question the constitutionality of procedures used at
trial, but at the time of trial the procedures were perfectly lawful,
the Court insisted that "interests in comity and finality must also
be considered" in determining the scope of review. 45 Stressing the
value of finality in criminal cases, the Court concluded that the
costs imposed by retroactive application of new rules on collateral
review outweigh the benefits. 46 It therefore jettisoned its earlier
approach, which evaluated new rules on a rule-by-rule basis in
determining whether retroactive application was warranted.4 7
In addition, the Court relied on two other principles as a
basis for its new approach to retroactivity. One was the deterrent
purpose of habeas review. Habeas proceedings, the Court
explained, are not designed to guarantee every defendant an
error-free trial.48 They serve, instead, to deter errors by judges and
state officials. 4 9 The Court reasoned that federal courts could
accomplish that goal by applying the constitutional standards that
prevailed at the time of the original judgment, without reference

41. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
42. Id. at 310.
43. Id. at 304-05 (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987)).
44. Id. at 310.
45. Id. at 308.
46. See id. at 309 (concluding that "[aipplication of constitutional rules not in
existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of
finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system"). The Court also

cited the scholarship ofJudge Friendly and Professors Bator and Mishkin. Id. at 309-10.
47. Id. at 301-02 (discussing the Court's earlier approach to evaluating new rules in
Linkletterv. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965)).
48. Id. at 305 (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618).
49. Id. at 308 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
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to new rules.o The other principle, mentioned only briefly in
Teague, was comity or respect for the procedures of state courts.5 1
The Court also announced two exceptions to the principle
that new rules should not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review. First, new substantive rules that place conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law should be given retroactive effect.5 2 In
Justice Harlan's view, non-retroactivity was warranted for new
procedural rules when the earlier procedure had accomplished
"concededly valid" ends.5 ' New substantive rules, by contrast,
should not yield to concerns about finality because "there is little
societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a
point where it ought properly never to repose." 54 Second, the
Court carved out an exception for rare "watershed rules of
criminal procedure" linked to the defendant's innocence that
implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial. 5
Today, retroactivity rules on collateral review draw no
distinction between challenges to convictions and challenges to
sentences. The Supreme Court has announced that, once direct
review has concluded, a presumption of finality attaches both "to
the conviction and sentence."56 Accordingly, it has consistently
applied Teague's non-retroactivity approach to collateral attacks on
sentences.57
The equivalence, for finality purposes, between convictions
and sentences has received only brief attention from the Court. In
50. Id. at 308 (agreeing with "Justice Harlan's description of the function of habeas
corpus"); Desistv. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
51. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-91 (1977)).
52. Id.at311.
53. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 693 (noting that collateral review on substantive grounds also involves
"none of the adverse collateral consequences of retrial"). Justice Harlan's opinion in
Mackey referred specifically to "substantive due process" claims. Id. at 692. Since Teague,
however, the Court has interpreted this exception to reach any new substantive rule,
regardless of its source. See, e.g., Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)
(explaining that Teague draws a "distinction between substance and procedure," and
declining to apply it to a claim based on the Court's interpretation of a criminal statute).
55. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. The Court acknowledged that it is "unlikely that many
such components of basic due process have yet to emerge," offering examples such as
mob violence at the courthouse and the brutal extortion of a confession. Id. at 313-14.
56. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463

U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
57. E.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S.
518, 527 (1997); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1992).
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Teague itself, Justice Stevens suggested in a concurring opinion
that the Court's new approach should not apply to challenges to
capital sentences, contending that the new approach to
retroactivity reflected only "the interest in making convictions
final," which is "wholly inapplicable to the capital sentencing
context."" In dictum, a plurality ofJustices disagreed, maintaining
that "collateral challenges to the sentence in a capital case, like
collateral challenges to the sentence in a noncapital case, delay
the enforcement of the judgment" and undermine certainty.5 9
Later in the same Term, a majority of the Court formally adopted
the latter view-apparently without the benefit of argument or
briefing-and applied the Teague framework to a collateral attack
on a capital sentence.o Thus, under current law, new rules of
constitutional procedure for sentencing do not apply retroactively
to sentences that have become final, unless one of Teague's
exceptions applies.
This essay does not undertake a systematic defense of
current habeas law, or of Teague in particular. Nor could it,
considering the voluminous body of scholarship criticizing the
limits on habeas relief imposed by the Supreme Court and by
Congress in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA")." Many scholars and judges have criticized the Teague
framework for over-emphasizing finality and, as a consequence,
for failing to vindicate newly announced constitutional rights.62
Congress and the courts may well have struck the wrong balance,
in Teague and other settings, for collateral challenges in general.

58. Teague, 489 U.S. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
59. Id. at 314 n.2.
60. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989) (echoing the plurality's view
in Teague that non-retroactivity rules should apply in capital cases); id. at 349 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (refusing to support that aspect of the opinion
"without benefit of argument or briefing on the issue").
61. See, e.g., Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow Holdings of
Supreme Court Precedents,14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 742-44 (2010); Stephen B. Bright,
Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Wy Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent
FederalJudgesIs Indispensable to Protecting ConstitutionalRights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1808,
1832-37 (2000); Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 252-53, 27173 (1988); Gary Peller, In Defense ofFederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation,16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 581, 582, 602-03 (1982); Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and
the Innocence Gap, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2313, 2340-41 (2007); Larry W. Yackle, The
Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2333 (1993).
62. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 29, at 1815-20.
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Instead, this essay focuses on the proposed distinction for
finality purposes between convictions and sentences. Scholars and
judges who draw that distinction accept, for the sake of argument,
that the Court has struck an appropriate balance in weighing
finality interests for collateral challenges to convictions.6 3 They
urge, however, that a different approach is warranted for
challenges to sentences. Testing the persuasiveness of that claim is
possible, and valuable, whether or not one endorses other aspects
of current law.
C. Retroactivity and Finalityin Miller
As a recent and controversial example of the current
retroactivity regime, in Miller v. Alabama64 the Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from imposing a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole on a juvenile offender.6' It explained that, although the
Constitution does not categorically forbid life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile murderers, a procedure that makes such a
sentence mandatory impermissibly "preclude [s] a sentencer from
taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of
characteristics and circumstances attendant to it."66 The rule of
Miller clearly governs all future cases and all cases pending on
direct review at the time of the decision. But the future is less
certain for the more than two thousand juvenile murderers who
received a mandatory sentence of life without parole that that
became final before Miller.6' A flurry of activity in legislatures and
courts has followed.
Sixteen states were affected by the Miller decision,68 and
state legislatures enacting "Miller fix" legislation have deliberated
over the retroactive application of new procedures to cases where

63.
64.
65.
66.

See, e.g., Russell, supra note 7, at 82-83.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Id. at 2460, 2473, 2475.
Id. at 2467.

67.

See id. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (estimating the number of affected

prisoners between 2,000 and 2,500).
68. Cf. Douglas Berman, Effective Press Review of Some State Responses to SCOTUS Miller
Ruling, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Aug. 19, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.sentencing.typ
epad.com/sentencing law and policy/ 2013/08/effective-press-review-of-some-state-respo
nses-to-scotus-miller-ruling.html (noting that, as of August 2013, "at least 10 states have
changed laws to comply with the ruling").
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the sentence had become final. In five states (California,
Delaware, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Wyoming), the
legislature expressly made the new procedures retroactive. 69
Because of their high concentration of juvenile life-without-parole
sentences, those states account for approximately twenty-five
percent of the total.? Legislatures in two other states (Arkansas
and Texas) specified that their Miller fix should not apply
retroactively," while legislation in another four states (Nebraska,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah) leaves the question
unaddressed.12
For prisoners in the last group of states, and in states where
no legislation responding to Miller has been enacted, the Teague
framework governs whether the decision will apply retroactively.
There is no question that Miller announced a "new rule," one not
dictated by prior precedent. The Court had previously held that
the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits capital punishment
for juvenile offenders, 3 as well as sentences of life without parole
for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.7 4 But before
Miller it had never extended the Eighth Amendment bar against
life-without-parole sentences to juvenile murderers, and it
certainly had not combined two "strands of precedent" to
announce a bar on mandatory sentences of life without parole,
while leaving open the possibility of discretionary sentences of that
type. 5 Since Miller, every court to consider the question has

69. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (2) (A) (i)-(ii) (2013) (granting a right to petition
for resentencing after fifteen years, but excluding offenders who killed certain law
enforcement personnel or who tortured their victims); 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4204A, 4209A (2007) (granting a right to seek sentence modification after twenty-five or
thirty-five years, depending on the degree of murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:5744(E) (1) (2013) (granting juvenile murders who satisfy certain conditions a right to seek
parole after thirty-five years); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(c) (2013) (granting a right to
parole after serving twenty-five years of incarceration).
70. SeeJuveniles Serving Life Sentences Without Parole in the U.S., PBS FRONTLINE, http:/
/www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/whenkidsgetlife/etc/map.html
(last visited Nov.
14, 2013) (based on data from Human Rights Watch).
71. See 2013 Ark. Act 1490; 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2d Called Sess. Ch. 2 (S.B. 2).
72. See Maggie Clark et al., Life Without ParoleforJuveniles: States and Courts Weigh In,
PEW CHARITABLE TR. STATELINE NEWS SERVICE (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org
/research/data-visualizations/life-without-parole-for-juveniles-states-and-courts-weigh-in85899500114#.
73. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
74. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
75. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
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agreed that the decision announced a new rule within the
meaning of Teague.'6
Courts have divided, however, about whether Millerfits the
first Teague exception for substantive rather than procedural rules.
The Court took pains in Miller to explain that "our decision does
not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders," but instead
requires only "a certain process-considering an offender's youth
and attendant characteristics-before imposing a particular
penalty." Because a sentence of life without parole remains a
"concededly valid" end in sentencing a juvenile murderer, 8 and
Miller alters only the required process (discretionary rather than
mandatory), most courts to consider the question have concluded
that Miller does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review. The Eleventh Circuit and Fifth Circuit, along with state
courts in Minnesota, Louisiana, Michigan, and Florida have
reached that conclusion, although some of the state court
decisions remain pending on appeal.7 9
On the other hand, even if a life-without-parole sentence
remains legally permissible, it is likely that most juvenile offenders
would receive a different sentence today. As the Court noted in
Miller, the lopsided percentage of juvenile life-without-parole
sentences imposed in states where it is mandatory suggests that
discretionary procedures "relatively rarely" produce the same
result.8 0 In addition, the Court granted relief in a companion case
to Miller (Jackson v. Hobbs) that presented a collateral challenge.8 1
76. See, e.g., In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1366-67 (11th Cir. 2013); Craig v. Cain,
2013 WL 69128, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (per curiam); Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568,
2013 WL 364198, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Mich.Jan. 30, 2013).
77. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
78. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
79. See In re Morgan, 713 F.3d at 1367-68; Craig,2013 WL 69128, at *1-2; Chambers
v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 326-29 (Minn. 2013); State v. Huntley, 118 So. 3d 95, 98-101
(La. Ct. App. 2013); People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 708 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Geter v.
State, 115 So. 3d 375, 377-84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see alsoJohnson v. United States,
720 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 2013) (Colloton, J., dissenting from order authorizing
successive § 2255 motions).
80. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 n.10. A high likelihood of a different sentence does not
establish, however, that "the law cannot impose" the original sentence. See Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004). It would be strange to treat the Teague exception
for substantive rules as, in essence, a second layer of harmless-error review.
81. Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). Drawing any inference from the Court's
treatment ofJackson is hazardous, however, because the case came to the Court on direct
review of a state court's denial of relief under state postconviction procedures. The Court
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Based on those considerations, state courts in Mississippi, Iowa,
and Illinois have held that Miller applies retroactively because it
announced a new substantive rule. 2 The U.S. Department of
Justice apparently agrees,8 3 as do a few federal judges and
commentators, 84 and (in case you were wondering) the editorial
board of the New York Times.85 To date, however, that remains a
minority view in the courts.
The upshot is that, for most juvenile murderers whose lifewithout-parole sentences became final before Miller, the strong
interests in finality recognized by current law will prevent them
from obtaining collateral relief. The fact that Miller involves a
challenge to a criminal sentence, as opposed to a conviction, is
irrelevant.
A number of scholars and courts seek to change that aspect
of retroactivity law, advancing two lines of argument that zero in
on the finality interests in criminal sentences. Some advance a
strong form of the argument, contending that all sentences carry
diminished finality interests. Others make more modest claims
that focus on particular kinds of sentences or sentencing rules that
implicate diminished finality interests. The remainder of this essay
considers each form of the argument in turn.

has squarely held that such procedures are not bound by Teague. Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264, 278-79 (2008).
82. See People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1021-22 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012); State v.
Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 113-16 (Iowa 2013); Jones v. State, 2013 WL 3756564, at *3
(Miss. July 18, 2013). Several federal circuits have issued tentative opinions permitting
Miller challenges to go forward based on a "prima facie showing" that the decision applies
retroactively, without squarely resolving the issue. See In re Pendleton, No. 12-3617, 2013
WL 5486170, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 3, 2013) (per curiam); Wang v. United States, No. 132426 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013); In rejames, No. 12-287 (4th Cir. May 10, 2013); Johnson v.
United States, 720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
83. See Government's Response to Petitioner's Application for Authorization to File
a Second or Successive Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, at 6-7, Johnson v. United States,
720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (No. 12-3744).
84.

See In re Morgan, 717 F.3d at 1195-96 (Barkett,

J.,

dissenting from denial of

rehearing en banc); Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 30, 2013); Erwin Chemerinsky,juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means CourtsMust Look
at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. LAW NEWS NOW (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.abajournal.co
m/news/article/chemerinsky juvenile life-withoutparole-case means courts must look
at sen.
85. Editorial, supra note 2.
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III. THE STRONG FORM: Do ALL SENTENCES IMPLICATE
DIMINISHED FINALITY INTERESTS?
In its strong form, the argument is that sentences implicate
categorically different and diminished finality interests, justifying a
two-tier retroactivity regime with relaxed rules for challenges to
sentences. In her recent article Reluctance to Resentence, Professor
Sarah French Russell faults courts for their unwillingness to order
resentencing on collateral review, arguing that "concerns about
finality are much less pressing when a court reconsiders the length
of a sentence rather than the validity of a conviction."8 6 She urges
that the finality interests underlying sentences should be
reconsidered, with corresponding changes to rules governing
retroactivity and other subjects on collateral review.87 Professor
Douglas Berman similarly contends, in his essay as part of this
symposium, that modern finality doctrine should distinguish
between final convictions and final sentences.8 8 Earlier scholarship
presses similar, if more abbreviated, arguments about the
diminished finality interests in sentences.89

Although to date it has escaped the attention of legal
scholars, a surprising number of federal appellate courts have
relied on the same distinction in crafting doctrine for cases on
collateral and direct review. The Tenth Circuit has adopted a
more exacting standard for attorney performance in ineffective
assistance of counsel claims challenging a capital sentence, based
in part on "the minimized state interest in finality when
resentencing alone is the remedy." 90 The D.C. Circuit requires a
lesser showing of "prejudice" sufficient to excuse procedural
default on collateral review when a petitioner challenges a

86. Russell, supra note 7, at 82-83.
87. See Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1716-17 (2003).
88. Berman, Finalityfor Sentences, supra note 7, at 152-53.
89. See Heald, supra note 8, at 1320-21 (urging that lesser finality interests attend
capital sentences, but for reasons that would apply to any sentence); Christopher S.
Strauss, Comment, Collateral Damage: How the Supreme Court's Retroactivity Doctrine Affects
Federal Drug Prisoners' Apprendi Claims on Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1265
(2003) ("Whatever legitimate interests the criminal process has in respecting the finality
of an adjudication of guilt, that interest is not as strong when a new constitutional rule,
such as Apprendi, only affects a sentencing determination.").
90. Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 859 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Osborn v.
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 n. 12 (10th Cir. 1988)).
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sentencing error, rather than a trial error.91 It also sets a lower
standard for remand based on clearly erroneous factual findings,
citing "the lesser costs to the systemic interests in finality where
resentencing, as opposed to retrial, is the appropriate remedy." 9 2
The Second Circuit has adopted a relaxed "plain error" standard
for unpreserved errors when the error occurred at sentencing,
rather than at trial. 93 In 2006, a panel of the Ninth Circuit seemed
poised to adopt the strong form of the argument against
sentencing finality, carving out an exception to ordinary
retroactivity principles to accommodate new rules of sentencing
procedure announced in United States v. Booker.> Although the
panel ultimately reversed course, Judge Pregerson's dissenting
opinion defended the initial result on the ground that "the
interest in repose is lessened all the more because we deal not with
finality of a conviction, but rather the finality of a sentence."9 5
The strong form of the argument touches on each of the
major rationales for the finality of criminal judgments generally:
the cost of resentencing, as opposed to retrial; the accuracy of new
sentencing proceedings, as opposed to new trials; and the damage
to the reputation of the criminal justice system when reopening
sentences, but leaving the underlying conviction intact. Although
the argument on each of those grounds has some appeal, it is
ultimately unpersuasive.
A. The Costs ofRelitigating Sentences
Initially, it should be uncontroversial that sentencing in
felony cases is costly, both in time and resources, for various
stakeholders in the criminal justice system. It is costly for the
courts. Typically, probation officers or court staff must conduct a
presentence investigation that includes interviews with the
91. United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("In the special
context of sentencing errors, moreover, we think that the required showing of 'prejudice'
should be slightly less exacting than it is in the context of trial errors" because
resentencing is nowhere near as costly or chancy an event as a trial.").
92. United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Saro,
24 F.3d at 287-88).
93. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005).
94. Carrington v. United States, 470 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2006) (ordering recall of
the mandate to permit resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005)).
95. Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 901 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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offender, victims, and perhaps family members, witnesses, and
others. 96 They must file a written report setting forth the findings
of the investigation, often accompanied by recommended factual
findings or even a recommended sentence. 97 The court must then
convene a sentencing hearing, oversee the introduction of
evidence and perhaps testimony, consider the arguments of
counsel, and render judgment.98 Sentencing is also costly for the
parties. Prosecutors and defense counsel must engage in briefing
and motion practice concerning the presentence report as well as
the appropriate sentence. 99 They may also need to prepare
witnesses for examination and cross-examination, or prepare the
defendant to address the court. 00 Sentencing may impose further
costs on third parties, including victims, witnesses, medical
experts, and prison officials.101 The widespread adoption of
determinate sentencing reforms, and especially sentencing
guidelines, has increased the complexity and cost of sentencing in
time and resources. 102
Sentencing tends to be particularly time and resource
intensive in the kind of cases challenged on collateral review,
which disproportionately involve lengthy terms of incarceration.
Because the collateral review process takes years-as noted above,
the average habeas petition is filed 6.3 years after conviction 1 0 3-it
is generally available only to offenders serving sentences of long-

96.
reports);

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) (setting forth required contents of federal presentence
OFFICE

OF

PROBATION

AND

PRETRIAL

SERVICES,

THE

PRESENTENCE

INVESTIGATION REPORT ch. II-1-26 (2006), available at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-to
pics-sentencing/the-presentence-investigation-report.pdf?sfvrsn=4 (offering guidance to
probation officers responsible for presentence investigations).
97. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c) (1) (A) (requiring a presentence investigation and
report, with a few narrow exceptions).
98. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (requiring a statement of reasons for the sentence
"in open court").
99. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f) (authorizing parties to file objections to the report
and to be heard at the sentencing hearing).
100. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii)) (giving the defendant a right to
allocute at sentencing).
101. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i) (4) (B) (granting victims a right "to be reasonably
heard" at sentencing); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2) (authorizing courts to permit parties to
introduce evidence, including witness testimony, at sentencing).
102. See Symposium, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 263, 316 (1996)
(noting the remarks of Judge Sarah Evans Barker, objecting that under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines "we have sentencing hearings that last two hours instead of twenty
minutes because we have to go through this whole process").
103. See KING ETAL., supra note 26, at 22 and accompanying text.
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term imprisonment. Among habeas petitioners in noncapital
cases,104 27.7% are serving life sentences, and among the
remainder
the
average
sentence
is twenty years
of
1
05
imprisonment.
Less than 12% of habeas petitioners are serving
sentences of five years or less. 106 That profile of sentences is far
more severe than the population as a whole. In state courts,
around 60% of felony convictions result in a sentence of probation
or a relatively short jail term. 107 Life sentences represent just 0.3%
of all sentences imposed, and among offenders sentenced to a
term of incarceration, the median sentence length is one year and
five months. 10s It is true, as some critics of finality in sentencing
have argued, that sentencing procedure sometimes lacks the costly
features described above. Sentencing can even have an
uncomfortable assembly-line feel, with little advance preparation,
a succinct hearing, and a judgment entered swiftly and without
fanfare. But the pool of cases that actually reaches the collateral
review stage contains few quick-and-easy sentences. To the
contrary, it consists disproportionately of the kind of severe
sentences in which courts typically invest more time, resources,
and attention.
Judges and scholars who urge that sentences implicate
diminished finality interests do not deny that sentencing (and
resentencing) imposes substantial costs. Instead, they emphasize
the relative costs of resentencing and retrial. New sentencing
procedures, the argument goes, require a substantially smaller
commitment of judicial resources than new trials. 109 And because

104.

See ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF U.S.

COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD

STATISTICS, Mar. 31, 2012, tbl.C-4, availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc
=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/CO4Marl2.pdf
(reporting that petitions in capital cases represent approximately 0.9% of all habeas
petitions).
105. KING ET AL., supra note 26, at 20.
106. See id. at 20 (noting that 12% of petitioners serving a term of years, which
excludes life sentences, were serving a sentence of five years or less).
107.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006-

STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl.1.2. (2009), availableat http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/f
ssc06st.pdf.
108. Id. at tbls.1-3 & 1-4 (noting that the average term of incarceration is thirty-eight
months and the median is seventeen months).
109. See United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005) (reasoning that
"the cost of correcting a sentencing error is far less than the cost of a retrial" because " [a]
resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and requiring the attendance
of only the defendant, counsel, and court personnel"); United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283,
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the conservation of resources is a major rationale for interests in
finality, that difference in costs justifies the loosening of
restrictions on collateral relief for claims challenging the validity
of a sentence.
To be sure, criminal trials on average are substantially
longer, more complex, and more costly than sentencing
proceedings. The average criminal trial in federal court lasts four
or five days,110 and in state courts the average jury trial lasts two to
four days."' Sentencing hearings, by contrast, may take only a few
minutes and usually do not last more than an hour." 2 Judges and
court staff, prosecutors, and defendants and their counsel must
invest far more time and resources on pretrial motions and
preparation. Trials also impose significant direct and opportunity
costs on third parties, such as jurors, victims, witnesses, and
experts." Sentencing, on the other hand, rarely involves the
participation of a jury, and in-court testimony by witnesses and
other experts is less common and less time consuming than at
trial.
The claim that resentencing is less costly than retrial is
misleading, however, because it compares only per-procedure
costs while ignoring the enormous difference in volume between
trials and sentences. In the United States, the overwhelming
majority of people convicted of felonies plead guilty rather than
contesting their guilt at trial.114 In state courts, just 6% of felony
convictions result from trial." In federal court, the rate is even

287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (adopting a lesser prejudice standard for sentencing challenges
because "resentencing is nowhere near as costly or chancy an event as a trial"); Russell,
supra note 7, at 146, 149 (discussing how a court can correct a sentence using significantly
less resources than a new trial).
110. See Sara Sun Beale, FederalizingCrime:Assessing the Impact on the FederalCourts, 543
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 48 (1996); David L. Cook et al., Criminal Caseload
in U.S. District Courts: More Than Meets the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1579, 1597 (1995).
111. Nancy King, The American Criminal Juy, 62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 60
(1999).
112.

See Marc Mauer, Alice in Wonderland Goes to Criminal Court, Or, How Do We Develop

a More Effective Sentencing System?, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 259, 263 (1994).
113. See, e.g., King, supra note 111, at 60 (noting the "hefty portion of its resources"
that the justice system devotes to maintaining the criminal jury).
114. See BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 107, tbl.4.1 (showing that 94% of
felony convictions result from guilty pleas).
115. Id.
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lower: 3% of felony convictions result from trial." 6 By contrast,
100% of felony convictions result in a sentence. Thus, in state and
federal criminal systems driven by guilty pleas, sentencing has
displaced trial as the "main event" in the criminal process.' In
the vast majority of cases, sentencing represents the most
significant investment of judicial resources that might be
duplicated following collateral review." Only a small fraction of
prisoners can possibly raise a claim of trial error, but every
prisoner has the potential to raise a claim of sentencing error.
Accordingly, taking into account aggregate costs,
government interests in the finality of sentences are just as strong
as interests in convictions. Consider the federal system, where it is
estimated that an average trial takes four days1 19 and an average
sentencing hearing takes one hour. 120 Measured by the length of
court proceedings, that is a stark 32:1 difference in per-procedure
costs.121 But because almost 97% of convictions result from guilty
pleas rather than trials,12 2 sentencing hearings in federal court
outnumber trials by a 33:1 ratio. On those assumptions, the overall
investment of judicial resources for both procedures is roughly
equivalent. In state systems the calculation is similar. Trials on
average are slightly more frequent in state court, but also slightly

116.

U.S.

SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

STATISTICS, fig.C (2013).
117. See Russell, supra note 7, at 160 (noting that sentencing hearings are now the
"main event" for district judges in federal criminal cases); see generally Alan Dubois &
Anne E. Blanchard, Sentencing Due Process: How Courts Can Use Their Discretion to Make
Sentencings More Accurate and Trustworthy, 18 FED. SENT'G RPTR. 84 (2005) (calling the
notion that sentencing is a "sideshow" to the trial an "artifact of an earlier time," and
arguing that " [i] n an era of highly determinate sentencing systems where only a tiny
percentage of cases go to trial, sentencing has become by far the most important stage of
the criminal process for most defendants").
118. See Russell, supra note 7, at 146-48. To be sure, the investigative processresponding to crimes, questioning witnesses, and gathering and testing evidence to build
a case-requires significant investment as well. For purposes of collateral review, however,
those are sunk costs. A successful collateral attack on a conviction or sentence does not
require duplication of the investigation that led to the initial charge. Instead, an order to
conduct a new trial or new sentencing hearing requires a fresh investment of resources in
the adjudicative process.
119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
120. See Hon. Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic
State of Sentencing After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 645 (2007)
(reporting that for a "routine" sentencing hearing, the judge spends five to six hours to
sentence six or seven defendants).
121. The calculation assumes an eight-hour work day for the courts.
122. See Russell, supra note 7, at 160.
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shorter, meaning that trials and sentencing require a comparable
aggregate investment of resources.
Both the large volume of sentences in general and the
disproportionate severity of sentences challenged on collateral
review directly implicate the cost concerns underlying nonretroactivity under Teague. Proponents of the strong-form
argument against finality in sentencing accept, for the sake of
argument, that new rules of trial procedure should not be
retroactive in light of the high costs of new trials. Yet a trialspecific new rule can affect, at most, only 3-6% of final judgments.
A new rule of sentencing procedure, by contrast, in theory could
unsettle every final judgment because every offender, even those
who plead guilty, receives a sentence. And as a practical matter,
the kind of cases affected by a new rule of sentencing procedure
made retroactive on collateral review will be particularly costly.
Sarah French Russell makes a slightly different cost-based
argument against the finality of sentences, urging that
resentencing actually conserves public resources because
shortening a lengthy prison sentence conserves resources "that
would otherwise be spent on incarceration."' 2
Given the
staggering costs of mass incarceration, both in human and
economic terms, procedures to revise a sentence can indeed
produce significant savings. But a successful collateral attack on a
conviction secures even greater savings, requiring immediate
release and vacating the sentence entirely. Resentencing, by
contrast, may merely shorten the length of a long term of
imprisonment. Yet the potential cost savings have not persuaded
the courts to assign convictions a diminished interest in finality.
Not all new trials result in acquittal, of course, but neither do all
new sentencing hearings result in shorter sentences. Because all
forms of collateral review promise to reduce those costs, they do
not justify a distinction for finality purposes between convictions
and sentences.
B. The Accuracy of Resentencing Proceedings
Sentencing also implicates finality interests in the accuracy
of proceedings because it depends, in part, on backward-looking

123. Id. at 146; see id. at 150 (noting that the federal government spends $28,000 per
year to incarcerate a single prisoner).
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factual determinations. A sentencing court must consider, for
example, the severity of the offense, the "harm to a victim, and the
blameworthiness of the offender."1 24 The factual issues a court
must resolve at sentencing may include the offender's role in a
larger criminal enterprise, his use or possession of a firearm, his
mental state at the time of the crime, the quantity of drugs in a
trafficking case, or the amount of loss in a fraud case. Each of
those determinations requires a backward-looking assessment of
what happened at the time of the offense.
Making those findings requires the participation of several
key individuals. Typically the prosecutor and investigating case
agent supply crucial information to the court about the offense
conduct, as do the offender and defense counsel.12 1 Victims of the
crime, either individually or through a liaison such as a victimwitness coordinator, also provide information about the harm
caused by the offense.'1 Yet the passage of time may degrade the
reliability of that information. When a collateral challenge to a
sentence succeeds, the new sentencing hearing and presentence
investigation takes place, on average, more than seven years after
the original judgment.127 By that time the prosecutor, investigating
agent, and defense counsel may no longer be available for a host
of reasons, including a change of job, a move to another state,
illness, or death.128 And even if they remain accessible, their
recollection of the details of a case many years earlier will have
faded. As a consequence, courts are more likely to make errors at
resentencing than at an initial sentencing.
Critics of finality in sentencing acknowledge that risk, but
maintain that it is less serious for resentencing than for retrial.
They offer two reasons, one based on the relaxed rules of evidence

124.

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING

§ 1.02(2)(a)(1),

at 5 (Tentative Draft

No. 1, 2007) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING].
125. See OFFICE OF PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES, supra note 96, ch. II-22 (listing
possible questions for the AUSA and case agent).
126. Id. at 11-23-24.
127. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
128. See Henderson, supra note 28. Sarah French Russell reports, based on her
experience as a federal public defender, that counsel for the defendant and government
"may also be the same original players" following a successful Begay-type collateral attack
on a federal sentence. Russell, supra note 7, at 149. That experience, however, likely is not
typical of challenges to state-court judgments in habeas petitions, where the average
period between sentencing, vacatur of the sentence, and resentencing is more than seven
years. See KING ET AL., supra note 26.
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at sentencing, and the other based on the accuracy of forwardlooking determinations that also inform sentencing decisions.
First, they note, sentencing involves looser evidentiary rules
compared to trial. 129 Hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial,so
but is admissible and routinely introduced at sentencing. 3 1
Likewise, the Confrontation Clause grants defendants a
constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses at trial, 3 2 but that
right does not extend to sentencing hearings.133 Those relaxed
rules obviate the need for in-court testimony by witnesses,
investigators, lawyers, and victims, making it possible at sentencing
for someone else to recount their testimony secondhand. Indeed,
Professor Russell suggests that threats to accuracy at resentencing
can be avoided altogether. No new investigation is necessary
because the court can simply reuse the original presentence
investigation and report, perhaps with a few updates based on the
offender's conduct in prison.134 The threat to accuracy is therefore
less acute at resentencing.13 5
That generalization may apply to some sentencing
challenges, but it certainly does not hold for all of them. In the
last fifteen years, for example, by far the richest source of "new
rules" of sentencing procedure has been the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial right, as applied in cases like Apprendi v. New Jersey,13 6
Blakely v. Washington,137 and United States v. Booker.138 The whole

129. Berman, Finalityfor Sentences, supra note 7, at 166-67; Russell, supra note 7, at
152.
130. See FED. R. EVID. 802-804.
131. See FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (3) (excepting from the Federal Rules of Evidence
"miscellaneous proceedings" including sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
249-50 (1949) (noting that probation officers reports have been given great weight in
sentencing hearings); Jerome Deise & Raymond Paternoster, More than a "Quick Glimpse of
the Life": The Relationship Between Victim Impact Evidence and Death Sentencing, 40 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 611, 626 (2013) ("[Hlearsay evidence is routinely offered as substantive
evidence.").
132. U.S. CONST. art. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
133. Williams, 337 U.S. at 249-50.
134. Russell, supra note 7, at 149.
135. See United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Williams, J.,
dissenting) (urging a lower standard for "fundamental defects" in § 2255 cases on the
ground that "in the ordinary habeas case" any remedy is "more costly for the system than
it would have been" because "in a new trial, the government will be hobbled by the
staleness of its evidence and the risk of an erroneous acquittal will be higher," whereas
resentencing "is not markedly more burdensome" than a direct appeal).
136. Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
137. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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point of those claims is to demand more formal proceduresfactfinding by a jury, a standard of proof beyond a reasonable
factual
backward-looking
etc.-for
making
doubt,
13 9
determinations.
Repeating that exercise with more demanding
procedural requirements many years after the crime raises exactly
the kind of accuracy concerns implicated by a new trial.
Moreover, virtually the same arguments downplaying the
risk of inaccuracy could be advanced about challenges to
convictions. When a court orders a new trial following a collateral
challenge, the government does not need to reinvestigate the
entire case from scratch. Except in rare instances where forensic
evidence has spoiled without ever being tested, the same evidence,
documents, expert reports, interviews, and witness statements
remain available and admissible at the new trial. Nor is the
unavailability of witnesses necessarily fatal. Although hearsay rules
apply with full force at trial, the Federal Rules of Evidence and
their state-law equivalents contain a hearsay exception for "former
testimony" admitted at a previous proceeding. 14 0 Likewise, the
Confrontation Clause permits the introduction of hearsay
evidence at trial when a witness is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 141 Those
exceptions ordinarily should be available when a witness has
become unavailable during the pendency of collateral review,
since the defendant had an opportunity for cross-examination at
the original trial.
Concerns about accuracy relate not only to the
admissibility of evidence, but to its effectiveness. Even when
witnesses remain available to testify at a new trial or for an
interview during a presentence investigation, they may no longer
remember-or may affirmatively misremember-important details
about the crime, making accurate factfinding more difficult.
When witnesses have become unavailable, the recitation of an
eight-year-old trial transcript cannot compare with a witness's live
testimony before a factfinder. The risk of inaccuracy at sentencing
138.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

139. See id. at 226 (considering a Sixth Amendment challenge to factual findings
concerning the quantity of drugs involved in the offense); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298
(considering a Sixth Amendment challenge to factual findings that the offender
obstructed justice and acted with unusual cruelty).
140. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (1).
141. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
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is particularly acute when it comes to victims. Not only can victims
become unavailable, depriving the court of an essential voice in
the sentencing process,14 2 but the passage of time may cloud the
victim's sense of the full impact of the crime.1 4 3 Because accuracy
concerns are prevalent in both contexts, the same finality interests
that justify limits on collateral review of trials also justify limits on
collateral review of sentences.
In addition, concerns about accuracy are not confined to
the new proceedings in the original trial court. In part, they reflect
concerns about the ability of collateral review courts themselves, in
the first instance, to make an accurate determination about
whether an error has occurred. That is particularly true for claims
that depend on "new rules" of procedure, because the original
trial or sentencing proceeding, for obvious reasons, may not have
focused on the issue.14 4 Without a reliable record, courts, on
collateral review, may be left to guess whether the original
proceeding was infected with constitutional error. That kind of
accuracy concern applies equally to trial challenges and
sentencing challenges.
Second, and more provocatively, critics of finality in
collateral challenges to sentences contend that conducting a new
sentencing hearing, many years after the judgment becomes final,
actually enhances accuracy.14 That is because, in addition to
backward-looking factual determinations about offense conduct,
harm to victims, and culpability, sentencing also depends on
forward-looking predictions about the offender's dangerousness
and prospects for rehabilitation.1 4 6 At resentencing, those findings
of fact can benefit from new information about the offender's

142. But see Crime Victims' Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-405, tit. I, § 102(a), 118
Stat. 2261, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (granting crime victims the right to be
"reasonably heard" at sentencing); Paul G. Cassell, Barbariansat the Gates? A Reply to the
Critics of the Victims'Rights Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 479, 487-97 (discussing criminal
impact statements).
143. Cf. People v. Otto, 26 P.3d 1061, 1066 (Cal. 2001) (declining to require live
testimony by victims at proceedings to designate sexually violent predators under state law
based, in part, on concerns that the proceedings "may occur years after the predicate

offense or offenses," raising "a concern that victims and other percipient witnesses would
no longer be available").
144. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
145. Berman, Finalityfor Sentences, supra note 7, at 171-73; Russell, supra note 7, at
152-53.
146. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supranote 124, § 1.02(2) (a) (ii).
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behavior in prison, track record of success or failure in treatment,
and improved tools for predicting recidivism. In principle,
resentencing could also improve the "accuracy" of a court's
assessment of backward-looking factors like the seriousness of the
offense or the harm to victims. 14 7 Far from spoiling, Professor
Russell argues, evidence available at resentencing will have
"ripened." 148
The point is sound, but it is a peculiar non sequiturfrom the
alleged error in the original sentencing that forms the basis for
the collateral attack. To be sure, any time a court vacates a
sentence and begins again from scratch, new and helpful
information may be available to improve the accuracy of the
court's predictions. But the proper way to take account of that new
information is through sentence modification procedures
designed for that purpose. The Model Penal Code: Sentencing
revision's "second look" provisions, for example, call for the
reconsideration of all lengthy terms of incarceration after a period
of years. 149 A handful of states have similar discretionary
procedures for sentence modification based, among other factors,
on changed circumstances.1 50 Sentence modification procedures
have a sound basis in theory.'5 ' Equally important, as Cecilia
Klingele has argued, they offer a measure of transparency and

147. See Berman, Finalityfor Sentences, supra note 7, at 171-73. Over time, for example,
society may come to view some offenses as more serious (such as domestic abuse, child
pornography, drunk driving, or animal cruelty) and others less serious (such as the
possession of marijuana or crack cocaine, or certain consensual sex crimes). See MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) [hereinafter ALI]
("On proportionality grounds, societal assessments of offense gravity and offender
blameworthiness sometimes shift over the course of a generation or comparable
periods.").
148. Russell, supra note 7, at 153.
149. See ALI, supra note 147, § 305.6 (authorizing the judge or a judicial panel to
revisit the sentence of any offender who has served more than fifteen years in prison and
to decide whether, in light of current circumstances, a different sentence would better
serve the purposes of sentencing).
150. Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth:Judicial Sentence
Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 506-09
(2010).
151. See ALI, supra note 147, § 305.6 cmts. a, b (discussing the rationale for the MPC:
Sentencing draft's proposed sentence modification proceedings); Margaret Colgate Love
& Cecilia Klingele, First Thoughts About "Second Look" and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions
of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859, 873-76 (2011)
(discussing the benefits of sentence modification).
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public accountability not present in other back-end mechanisms
for release. 5 2
Collateral review, by contrast, is designed to deter or
correct specific errors at sentencing, not as a covert method of
obtaining sentencing modification. The non-retroactivity of new
rules of procedure, in particular, reflects the Court's view that
habeas review serves a deterrent purpose." The strong-form
argument against finality, on the other hand, proceeds from a
different premise. All resentencing is good, the syllogism goes,
and collateral review of sentences is therefore good to the extent it
maximizes the amount of resentencing. There is considerable
merit in "second look" and similar procedures, but collateral
review should not be conscripted to perform the same function in
a less transparent manner.
C. Resentencing and the Public Reputation of the
CriminalJusticeSystem
Among the most frequently advanced, but least developed,
attacks on finality interests in sentences centers on the public
reputation of the criminal justice system. Public attention and
anxiety may run high, the argument goes, when collateral review
unsettles a conviction that has become final, but a decision that
merely sets aside a sentence poses a lesser reputational threat. 15 4
The unstated premise is that the public does not much care about
sentences being reduced or prisoners being released, so long as
the underlying conviction remains intact.
That premise is difficult to accept in light of the
widespread adoption of "truth in sentencing" reforms in the last
twenty-five years. Beginning in the 1980s, the truth in sentencing
movement embraced determinate sentencing regimes as a way to
close the gap between the sentences announced by judges and

152. Klingele, supra note 150, at 515-19.
153. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Brokenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(invoking, without elaboration, "the lesser costs to the systemic interests in finality where
resentencing, as opposed to retrial, is the appropriate remedy"); Carrington v. United
States, 503 F.3d 888, 901 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (arguing that interests
in finality are lessoned "because we deal not with the finality of a conviction, but rather the
finality of a sentence," and stressing that "[t]here is no suggestion that [the defendants] be
set free" immediately).
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sentences actually served by offenders.'
Of particular concern
were non-transparent sentencing decisions rendered outside the
view of the public, such as the decisions of parole boards.'56
Congress embraced truth in sentencing as a central objective of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,157 and by 2000 the federal
system and sixteen states had abolished discretionary parole
altogether.1 58 In the 1990s, Congress "played a major role in the
Truth-in-Sentencing movement" by giving more than $10 billion
to states in incentive grants, designed to encourage the adoption
of laws requiring that violent offenders serve at least eighty-five
percent of their imposed sentences. 159 In many states, truth in
sentencing has also been instrumental in "restricting or
eliminating" early release procedures.16 0 Whatever one's views of
the efficacy of those reforms, there is no denying the public
appetite for truth in sentencing or its transformative effect on
American sentencing policy.16 1 The suggestion that society's
interests in finality are confined to convictions, rather than
sentences, is simply implausible.162
Along those lines, the D.C. Circuit has explicitly
considered, and rejected, the suggestion that collateral review of
sentences poses a lesser threat to the reputation of the criminal
justice system. In United States v. Pollard,' a case also noteworthy

155. Carole Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2550 (1996).
156. See Jeremy Travis et al., Prisoner Reentry: Issues for Practice and Policy, 17 CRIM.
JUST. 12, 17 (2002) (discussing parole supervision).

157. See Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (discussing one of the "primary purposes"
of the Sentencing Reform Act as "honesty in sentencing").
158. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REENTRY TRENDS IN THE
U.S.: RELEASES FROM STATE PRISON (2003), available at http://www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/con
tent/reentry/releases.cfm.
159. Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation:
Prison Populations, State Budgets, and Crime Rates, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 75 (1999);
see Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
20102, 20103, 108 Stat. 1796.
160. Klingele, supra note 150, at 481.
161. For a wide-ranging statistical survey of truth-in-sentencing reforms at the state
level, see BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS (1999),
availableat http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf
162.

Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Discussion Draft No. 3, at 16 (Mar. 29,

2010) (acknowledging that proposed "second look" sentence modification proceedings
are in tension with truth-in-sentencing principles).
163. United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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for its discussion of "wired pleas,"164 Judges Silberman and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg considered whether to adopt a "bi-level standard"
for collateral attacks that would distinguish between convictions
and sentences.1 6' The court declined to treat limits on collateral
relief as "elastic terms that shift in meaning depending on the
nature of the relief sought," citing doubts about judges' power to
apply lesser standards whenever they believe the costs of the
remedy to be particularly low. 166 But the court also stressed
society's interest in "bringing criminal appeals to an end," and
warned that a lesser standard for sentencing challenges "would
disserve this interest by making it considerably more attractive for
defendants to pursue collateral attacks on their sentences."16
Creating, in essence, an incentive to challenge sentences on
collateral review would prolong litigation and compromise the
reputation of the criminal justice system, no less than an incentive
to challenge convictions.
Professor Russell maintains that finality interests are
diminished in this context because society already tolerates
considerable
uncertainty
about
sentences.1 68
After
all,
discretionary parole, good-time credits, and early release
procedures (for example, due to prison overcrowding) routinely
hold open the possibility of a shortened sentence. Yet the
availability of those procedures, which varies considerably between
jurisdictions, hardly establishes that they pose no threat to the
reputation of the criminal justice system. Parole and good-time
credits, in particular, have eroded because of the truth in
sentencing movement.169 States' recent experiments with early
release-more often at the direction of a federal court than by
popular demand-have proven controversial as well.
Public outrage when violent criminals' sentences are cut
short also belies the suggestion that concerns about finality are

164. Id. at 1020-22.
165. Id. at 1029. Specifically, the court declined to require a "lesser showing" under
the miscarriage-of-justice exception when the remedy would be resentencing, rather than
rescission of a guilty plea. Id.
166. Id. at 1028.
167. Id. at 1029. The court also cautioned that a bi-level standard might tempt
appellate judges to second-guess trial judges' sentencing decisions. Id.
168. Russell, supra note 7, at 156.
169. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS
(1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf.
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diminished in that context. One infamous example, Willie
Horton's escape during a prison furlough and commission of a
brutal rape, became a flashpoint in the 1988 Presidential
election. 7 o More recently, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee's
run for President in 2007 was battered by criticism that he had
granted clemency or supported parole for more than one
thousand criminals, including a convicted rapist who committed
another rape and murder within a year of his release.1 71 As
Professor Russell acknowledges, victims of crime may find the
vacating of an offender's sentence particularly alarming, even if
the conviction remains intact, because it disrupts their sense of
closure and accelerates the date when the offender returns to the
street, placing them in danger once again.1 72 The intuition shared
by some scholars and judges that the public cares intensely about
the finality of convictions, but much less about the finality of
sentences, does not stand up to scrutiny.
In summary, each of the major justifications for taking
seriously the finality of criminal judgments-costs, accuracy, and
reputation-apply with equivalent force to trial claims and
sentencing claims. Resentencing requires a substantial investment
of resources, and the enormous volume of sentencing proceedings
in a system dominated by guilty pleas compensates for the high
per-procedure cost of trials. Like trials, sentencing requires
backward-looking factual determinations that may become less
accurate when key witnesses have become unavailable during the
pendency of a collateral attack. Uncertainty about the finality of
sentences also threatens the public reputation of the criminal
justice system, as evidenced by the truth-in-sentencing movement.
Accordingly, if interests in finality justify limits on collateral review
of criminal convictions, an across-the-board rule assigning lesser
interests in finality for collateral review of sentences is
unwarranted.

170. See David Cole, Turning the Corneron Mass Incarceration?,9 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L.
27, 42-43 (2011) (acknowledging that failures of early release, probation, and alternatives
to incarceration inevitably "will, in some instances, fail" and thereby "galvanize public
support for even harsher criminal policies").
171. Cara H. Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1123, 1146 &
n.141 (2012).
172. See Russell, supra note 7, at 155.
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FORM: Do SOME SENTENCING CASES

DESERVE DIFFERENT RULES ON COLLATERAL

REVIEW?

Some courts and scholars make more modest claims about
finality interests in sentencing, focused on particular kinds of
sentences or particular claims of sentencing error. Those special
sentencing cases, they contend, deserve different treatment on
collateral review because they can be resolved at especially low
cost, with little or no risk of inaccuracy, or with no meaningful
reputational damage.
The premise is entirely correct. Not all collateral attacks on
sentences pose the same threat to finality interests. Some new
sentencing rules and some individual offenders' sentencing claims
raise fewer finality concerns than others. But not all collateral
attacks on convictions pose the same threat to finality interests
either, and yet Congress and the courts have adopted a single set
of rules for those collateral attacks regardless of the particular
claim, context, or defendant.
There are good reasons for that uniform approach. A rule-

by-rule or case-by-case weighing of finality interests would be
unworkable for courts, layering standards upon standards and
producing a scheme of review that suffers from the appearance, if
not the reality, of arbitrariness. For those reasons, the Court has
adopted a unitary standard in analogous contexts, such as
qualified immunity and plain-error review. A fine-grained but
unpredictable retroactivity regime would also put an unhealthy
kind of pressure on courts, discouraging the identification of new
rules in the first place, to the detriment of the development of
constitutional law.
A more promising approach would focus on broad
categories of sentences, such as capital sentences or federal
sentences, rather than specific rules or offenders. Adding an
additional tier of review for retroactivity and other issues would
make collateral review doctrinally more complex, but not to the
same extent as a sliding-scale standard that varies with every case.
Identifying types of sentences that qualify for that treatment could
also reflect countervailing considerations that apply generally to
whole subsets of sentences. That approach, for example, would
also be a more straightforward method of addressing juvenile lifewithout-parole sentences under Miller.
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A. Some CollateralChallenges to Sentences Pose Lesser
Threats to FinalityInterests
Critics of finality in sentencing are correct that some kinds
of collateral attack on sentences pose an especially minimal threat
to finality interests. Some new rules implicate lesser finality
interests than others, such as the requirement of discretion for
juvenile life without parole sentences in Miller v. Alabama" and
the narrowing of predicate offenses for career offender status in
Begay v. United States.174 In addition, some individual offenders'
particular circumstances may alter the balance of finality interests,
as the Ninth Circuit initially concluded in Carrington v. United
States.1 15
Errors under Miller do not implicate the full range of
finality interests cited by the Court as grounds for limits on
collateral review. To be sure, resentencing a person who
committed murder as a juvenile many years after the original
sentence is costly and carries some risk of inaccuracy. But the
narrowness of the Miller rule helps to reduce those costs. Because
it applies only to juveniles who received a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment without parole, it affects fewer than 2,500
cases."' Those cases also involve few "sunk costs" because by
definition the life without parole sentence was mandatory.
Identifying Miller errors in the first instance is simple and in no
way dependent on stale factfinding; either the governing statute
made the sentence mandatory or it did not. Reputational concerns
may be diminished in this context as well. The Court in Miller
relied in part on a "national consensus" against mandatory life
without parole sentences for juvenile murderers,7 7 and the
decisions of many state legislatures to make "Miller fix" legislation
retroactive'
suggests considerable public willingness to
reconsider those sentences.
173. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469-71 (2012).
174. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
175. Carrington v. United States, 470 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn, and
superseded by 503 F.3d 888, 901 (9th Cir. 2007).
176. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2470-71 (majority opinion).
178. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2013) (granting a right to
petition for resentencing after 15 years, but excluding offenders who killed certain law
enforcement personnel or who tortured their victims); DEL. CODE ANN tit. 11, § 4217(f)
(West 2013) (granting a right to seek sentence modification after at least one-half of the
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Similarly, Professor Russell makes a convincing case that
lesser finality interests are at stake in challenges to federal
sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA")1 7 9
following the Supreme Court's decisions in Begay and related
cases.so Like Miller errors, Begay errors can be resolved easily as a
matter of law, based solely on the elements of a state law crime.
When raised on a motion for collateral review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, Begay claims almost always are litigated by the same
prosecutor and defense counsel, and resolved by the same judge,
who handled the original sentencing.' Their familiarity with the
case helps to reduce resentencing costs and minimize the risk of
inaccuracy.'1 2 Indeed, the judge frequently can impose a new
sentence without a full hearing because correcting the error
typically involves a straightforward reduction of the advisory
sentencing range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.' 8 3 If a
resentencing hearing is necessary, the absence of victims is less of
a concern because many Begay errors involve offenders convicted
of crimes with no identifiable victim, like drug trafficking and
immigration offenses.1 84
In addition, individual offenders in some circumstances
may raise collateral challenges to a sentence that implicate
diminished finality concerns. In Carrington, for example, two
prisoners brought postconviction motions seeking resentencing
following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker,'85
which rendered the federal sentencing guidelines advisory rather
than mandatory.' 86 Every court of appeals had concluded that
Booker did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review,
originally imposed sentence is served); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(E) (1) (2013)
(granting juvenile murderers who satisfy certain conditions a right to seek parole after
thirty-five years); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(c) (West 2013) (granting a right to parole
after serving twenty-five years of incarceration).
179. 18 U.S.C § 924 (2006).
180. See Russell, supra note 7, at 84-86.
181. Id. at 147.
182. Id. at 147, 153-54.
183. Id. at 147-48.
184. Id. at 155.
185. Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 889 (9th Cir. 2007).
186. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
187. See In re Zambrano, 433 F.3d 886, 889 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Cirilo-Munoz v. United
States, 404 F.3d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 2005); Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 140 (2d
Cir. 2005); Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 614 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 70 (4th Cir. 2005); Padilla v. United States, 416 F.3d 424, 427 (5th
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and the costs of a contrary ruling would have been staggering
because hundreds of thousands of prisoners had been sentenced
under the mandatory guidelines. But a panel of the Ninth Circuit
initially concluded that the two offenders in Carrington were
entitled to resentencing because of special circumstances in their
case. 8 At their original sentencing hearings years earlier, the
judge had expressed his view that the Guidelines were
unconstitutional and had made clear that he wished to impose less
severe sentences.18 9 After Booker, the judge took the extraordinary
step of imploring the Ninth Circuit for an opportunity to
resentence the men, writing that he was "sad and a little angry" at
the manifest injustice that had been done to them. 190 Granting
relief to offenders in that position, the panel reasoned, would
"place only a limited burden" on the government because the
sentencing judge's protests about the Guidelines and request for
an opportunity to resentence made the cases unique.191 At the
same time, the judge's intimate familiarity with the case would
reduce the cost of resentencing and reduce the risk of factfinding
errors.
No doubt there are many other examples of specific rules
of sentencing procedure or specific offenders whose collateral
cases pose a lesser threat to finality interests. For some judges and
scholars, the variability in the strength of finality interests at
sentencing justifies selectively relaxing limits on collateral review,
depending on the circumstances of the particular case.
B. Drawbacks to a Case-By-Case Approach to Finality in
Sentencing

However appealing it may be in individual cases, a regime
in which courts routinely calibrated limits on collateral review to
Cir. 2005); Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2005); Wilson v.
United States, 414 F.3d 829, 831-32 (7th Cir. 2005); Never Misses a Shot v. United States,
413 F.3d 781, 783-84 (8th Cir. 2005); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir.
2005); United States v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2005).
188.

Carrington v. United States, 470 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2006),

withdrawn and

superseded by 503 F.3d 888, 901 (9th Cir. 2007).
189. Id. at 922.
190. Tillitz v. United States, No. CO5-5411RJB, 2005 WL 2921957, at *14 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 3, 2005).
191. Carrington v. United States, 503 F.3d 888, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson,J.,
dissenting) (defending the panel's original decision).
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case-specific finality concerns would carry serious drawbacks.
Implementing that approach would require, in every case on
collateral review, that the court weigh and balance the finality
interests implicated by the particular claim and individual
offender against competing objectives. Then the court would need
to adjust the rules of collateral review on a sliding-scale basis to
reflect that balance.
For collateral attacks on convictions, however, the Court
and Congress have never required such a fine-grained assessment
of finality interests, even though some collateral attacks on
convictions implicate lesser finality interests than others. Nor has
the Court adopted that approach in analogous contexts, such as
qualified immunity for executive officials, instead announcing a
single "across the board" standard. 192 A case-by-case approach to
finality in sentencing would prove unworkable for courts, creating
the appearance (and probably the reality) of arbitrariness. That
indeterminacy would disserve the deterrent purpose of collateral
review, a central justification for non-retroactivity rules. At the
same time, it could distort the development of constitutional law
at sentencing by discouraging courts from announcing new rules
in the first place.
To begin, it is unclear why a case-by-case approach makes
sense for challenges to sentences, but not convictions. Not all
collateral attacks on convictions pose an identical threat to finality
interests either. Some new rules of trial procedure impose fewer
error-correction costs than others (e.g., narrow rules affecting a
small number of cases),193 or implicate diminished accuracy
concerns (e.g., where trial is unlikely because the remedy relates
to the terms of a guilty plea).194 Likewise, many individual cases
pose a lesser threat to finality because they will be resolved by
guilty plea, or will involve a relatively inexpensive trial, or involve
unspoiled evidence and readily available witnesses, or for case-

192. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
193. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360, 363-65 (1996) (invalidating a
state statute that placed the burden on defendants to prove incompetence to stand trial by
"clear and convincing evidence," a rule adopted in only four states and applicable only to
cases in which competence is contested and where the quantum of proof of incompetence
falls between a preponderance and clear and convincing evidence).
194. See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390-91 (2012) (finding ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining and ordering, as a remedy, that the State
must offer a guilty plea to the defendant on the original terms).
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specific reasons could enhance the public reputation of the
criminal justice system through a new trial. Yet Congress and the
courts have adopted a single set of rules for collateral attacks on
convictions, regardless of the particular claim, context, or
defendant.
The same is true in the analogous context of qualified
immunity for government officials in actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of
Narcotics.195 Qualified immunity shields government officials from
personal liability in damages for constitutional violations, unless
their conduct violated "clearly established . .. constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known." 196 As numerous
scholars have observed, the "new rule" inquiry under Teague and
the "clearly established" law inquiry for qualified immunity bear a
strong conceptual connection. 197 Both require a determination of
the state of the law at an earlier point in time, often based on
inferences about the application of then-existing precedent to new
circumstances. Both also reflect a policy-driven judgment by the
Court that seeks to balance the vindication of federal rights
against other interests. 198
Yet in the qualified immunity context, the Court has
expressly rejected a case-by-case interest balancing approach. In
Anderson v. Creighton,199 the plaintiffs urged that a more relaxed
"clearly established law" standard should apply based on the type
of claim (an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment), the
defendant (an FBI agent), and the particular circumstances (a
search for a fugitive in an innocent third party's home).2oo The
195. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
196. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
197. See, e.g., Melissa M. Berry, Seeking Clarity in the Federal Habeas Fog: Determining
What Constitutes "Clearly Established" Law Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 763-64 & nn.79-80 (2005); James S. Liebman & William F.
Ryan, "Some Effectual Power." The Quantity and Quality ofDecisionmaking Required ofArticle III
and the Supremacy Clause Demand of the Federal Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 858-61
(1998); Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98
CoLUM. L. REV. 888, 925-27, 946-47 (1998); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45

STAN. L. REV. 575, 635-43 (1993).
198. See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14 (explaining that "resolution of immunity
questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available
alternative").
199. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
200. Id. at 643-44.
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Court refused, announcing that it was "unwilling to complicate
qualified immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of
immunity turn on the precise nature of various officials' duties or
the precise character of the particular rights alleged to have been
20 The Court cautioned against "an immunity that has as
violated."o
many variants as there are modes of official action and types of
rights," and declined to "Balkanize the rule of qualified immunity
by carving exceptions at the level of detail" proposed by the
plaintiffs.20 2 It concluded, instead, that "the doctrine of qualified
immunity reflects a balance that has been struck 'across the
board.' 2 0 3 Although a few scholars and dissenting Justices have
criticized that feature of qualified-immunity law, 204 the Court has
retained a single unified standard.
It is therefore mistaken to fault collateral-review courts for
their "reluctance to resentence" (Professor Russell's phrase) or
their "'finality fixation' in the context of sentencing issues"
(Professor Berman's phrase). 20 Courts' reluctance to individually
consider the finality considerations raised by particular claims or
cases is not the product of some special hostility toward sentencing
challenges, but a general preference for crafting doctrine that
strikes a single reasonable balance between competing interests,
applicable across the board. There are good reasons for that
approach, and nothing about the sentencing context justifies a
departure from it.
For several reasons, a case-by-case approach to finality in
sentencing on collateral review would prove complex and
unworkable for courts, likely resulting in a hopelessly
indeterminate standard. First, the initial fine-grain assessment of
the finality interests implicated in a particular case would be
difficult. To succeed, it would require a review of the totality of the
circumstances relevant to finality, including the costs of
resentencing the particular offender, the accuracy of further
proceedings, and any case-specific reputational concerns. A court
reviewing the case on collateral review, however, will rarely have
201.

Id. at 643.

202. Id. at 643, 646.
203. Id. at 642 (quoting Harlow,457 U.S. at 821
204. See id. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Kit
1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L.
qualified immunity).
205. Berman, DistinguishingFinality, supra note

(Brennan, J., concurring)).
Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section
REV. 597, 618-34 (1989) (discussing
7; Russell, supra note 7.
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complete information on those subjects, which depend heavily on
the choices that the parties and the court ultimately make at
resentencing. Usually it will not be clear to a habeas court, for
example, whether a state-court judge will order a complete
presentence investigation, or whether the original investigating
officer and victims remain available and willing to participate, or
whether there are new or contested facts to litigate. In theory the
case-by-case approach allows a careful calibration of doctrine to
the circumstances, but in practice it would force collateral review
courts to make speculative guesses about the finality interests at
stake.
Second, compounding the complexity for courts, resolving
each challenge would require "stacking" a flexible standard for
assessing finality interests on top of various limits on habeas
review, which may themselves operate as a flexible standards
rather than bright-line rules. Harmless-error requirements,20 6
procedural-default doctrines,2 0 and even limitation periods2 08 on
collateral review often require the application of standards.
Retroactivity under Teague likewise may require the application of
two standards: an evaluation of the state of the law at the time the
judgment became final, and the underlying constitutional law,
which may be expressed as a standard (e.g., whether a sentence is
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime in violation of the Eighth
Amendment) .209 Layering standard upon standard (perhaps upon
another standard!) in that fashion is exceedingly complicated, and
perhaps simply unrealistic. Lower courts, in particular, would have
difficulty interpreting and applying the decisions of appellate
courts in a consistent manner because, as Alan Chen has argued in
the qualified immunity context, the stacking of standards upon
standards can confuse and mask courts' reasons for their

206. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (holding that habeas relief
must be denied if the error did not have "a substantial and injurious effect or influence"
on the outcome, based on all of the evidence (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946))).
207. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (excusing procedural default upon a
showing of "actual innocence," meaning that "it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found [the] petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" in
light of all of the evidence).
208. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1932 (2013) (applying the "actual
innocence" exception to AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas
petitions).
209. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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decisions. 210 Over time, an approach that attempts to capture with
precision the finality interests at stake in a particular claim or case,
and to modulate limits on collateral review accordingly, will suffer
from the appearance, and probably the reality, of unpredictability
and arbitrariness.2 11
To illustrate the point, consider the retroactivity regime
that preceded Teague. In Linkletter v. Walker,212 the Court adopted
a three-prong balancing test for retroactivity, taking into account
the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on former law,
and the effects of retroactivity on the administration of justice.2 13
The idea was to strike a careful balance of competing
considerations, including finality interests, on a rule-by-rule basis.
In practice, however, Linkletter's balance of competing interests
proved hopelessly indeterminate and unworkable, producing
"doctrinal confusion" and inconsistency. 214 Different judges and
circuits frequently disagreed about the retroactivity of new rules,
leading to criticism that the fluidity of the standard made it easy to
manipulate.21 ' The perceived failure of Linkletter's rule-by-rule
approach became a driving force behind the new framework
adopted in Teague.216 There is no reason to believe a similar
multifactor balancing test, this time oriented toward finality
interests at stake at sentencing, would perform better.

210. See Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of
Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOwA L. REv. 261, 316-18 (1995) (arguing that the
stacking of qualified immunity standards on underlying substantive constitutional law
standards may "completely eliminate the deliberative advantages of constitutional
standards").
211. Cf John Bernard Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral
Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 35, 84-85 (1985) (arguing, in the context of retroactivity
under Linkletter, that "[elxcessively complex doctrines may be too difficult for courts and
parties to understand, effectively precluding just application" and that the Court should
strive for "as much complexity as necessary to make a doctrine theoretically just without
making it either incomprehensible or too intricate for practical application").
212. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1964).
213. Id. at 629.
214. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Corr, supra note 211, at 74 (noting that "[a]lmost every feature of the three-pronged
approach has been a source of uncertainty and confusion" for lower courts).
215. Cf. Ann Althouse, Saying What Rights Are-In and Out of Context, 1991 Wis. L. REv.
929, 949 (1991) (acknowledging the "practical problems" created by Linkletter's
"nebulous" three-factor analysis).
216. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305 (1989) (indicating that under the Linkletter
standard, the court's "failure to treat retroactivity as a threshold question," and inability
"to account for the nature and function of collateral review").
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Because of its complexity and unpredictability, a case-bycase approach to finality interests at sentencing would also disserve
the deterrent purpose of collateral review. Although the
proposition is controversial among scholars, the Court
increasingly has described the objective of collateral review as the
deterrence, rather than the correction, of constitutional errors.2 17
The Court's decision in Teague is a particularly clear example, and
limits on habeas relief later imposed by Congress in AEDPA are
consistent with that understanding.2 18 Vacating sentences based on
new rules of procedure, even if it occurs only selectively, would do
nothing to advance a deterrent purpose because the original
sentence was perfectly lawful under the "old rules" applicable at
the time of the decision. A court imposing an initial sentence
cannot possibly know what finality interests will remain salient in a
particular case many years later, since those interests depend on
the nature of the not-yet-announced new rule and the fate of
witnesses and evidence in the years that follow. Thus, selectively
vacating final sentences would introduce an element of
randomness to collateral review that could undermine its
deterrent effect. The same threat to deterrence would be present
if the layering of a case-by-case finality balancing test on top of
existing doctrine produces unpredictable or arbitrary results in
practice.
Thus, whatever their superficial appeal, even more modest
claims about finality in sentencing on collateral review are
ultimately unpersuasive. Although there is no question that some
sentencing claims and individual cases pose lesser threats to
finality interests than others, it does not follow that collateralreview doctrine must be calibrated accordingly. Practical
difficulties in implementing such a complex standard, and tension
with the deterrent purpose of collateral review, militate against the
kind of case-by-case approach that the Court has rejected for
collateral review of convictions and in analogous contexts.

217. Joseph L. Hoffman, The Supreme Court's New Vision of FederalHabeas Corpus for
State Prisoners,1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 178 (1989).
218. See Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness,Habeas Theory, and the
Nature ofLegal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 535, 607-08 (1999).
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C. Finality Interestsfor Broad Categories of Sentences

This essay has challenged claims that all challenges to
sentences implicate diminished finality interests, as well as claims
that the lesser threat to finality posed by particular offenders or
types of error justifies different rules for collateral review. A final
set of arguments, however, is conceptually more plausible. Some
scholars and judges have urged that broad categories of sentences
deserve distinctive treatment on collateral review, based in part on
the implications for finality. Two categories especially prominent
in the literature are (1) challenges to capital sentences, and (2)
challenges to federal sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
First, a number of scholars, echoing Justice Stevens's
concurring opinion in Teague,219 have urged that finality interests
deserve less weight when a prisoner challenges a capital sentence
on collateral review. 220 Paul Heald contends that accuracy
concerns are lessened at capital sentencing hearings because the
central issue is the defendant's character, which is "not so subject
to the vicissitudes of time" as the evidence needed for retrial.2 21
Other scholars have argued that reputational risks are minimal
because, even if a death sentence is vacated, the defendant will
receive a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole and will therefore remain off the streets permanently.22 2
One could quibble with some aspects of those arguments.22 3
219. Teauge, 489 U.S. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (calling finality "an interest that is wholly inapplicable to the capital
sentencing context"); see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
220. See Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death Sentenced
Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able To Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 396-400 (1991) (urging that states' interest in finality are
outweighed in the capital sentencing context); Heald, supra note 8, at 1320-21 ("The
state's interest in the finality of a petitioner's conviction for murder is greater than its
interest in the capital sentence he has received."); Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity,
Habeas Corpus, and the Death Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160, 180-90 (1991)
(urging that retroactivity doctrine should operate differently in capital sentencing cases);
Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas CapitalAppeals, 18
J.L. & POL. 773, 812 (2002) ("There is a place for finality in judicial decision-making, but
in a capital case finality should give way to confidence in our system ofjustice.").
221. Heald, supra note 8, at 1320.
222. Id.; Goldstein, supra note 220, at 397.
223. As to accuracy, many aggravating and mitigating factors under capital sentencing
statutes involve backward-looking factual determinations about the offender's actions and
state of mind at the time of the offense, not just his present-day character and prospects
for rehabilitation. In particular, victim impact evidence is critical, yet the long delays
caused by collateral review may render that kind of testimony less effective or unavailable.
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Conspicuously absent, for example, is any discussion of the costs of
resentencing in time and resources. Capital sentencing is
expensive and every bit as procedurally complex as trial, requiring
the participation of ajury and extensive in-court witness testimony.
Indeed, the extraordinary delays and costs of sentencing,
collateral review, and resentencing in capital cases has become a
major rallying cry for opponents of the death penalty.
But finality interests are only part of the story. The
argument for relaxed collateral review standards in capital cases
rests principally on the gravity, irreversibility, and unique nature
of the death penalty.224 It emphasizes the high stakes for prisoners
for whom a collateral attack is a matter of life or death, and the
correspondingly strong interests in avoiding errors in capital cases.
Considering the myriad ways in which "death is different" for
constitutional purposes, there are forceful grounds for striking a
different balance between finality interests and competing
considerations, regardless of whether challenges to death
sentences truly raise fewer finality concerns than challenges to
noncapital sentences or convictions. Indeed, as a practical matter,
courts may already be treating capital sentencing claims
differently. Although the Court has repeatedly stated that capital
sentences should not receive a different standard of review on
habeas review,22 5 the success rate is far higher for capital cases
(more than 12.4%) than for noncapital cases (less than 0.3%) .221
In part that gap reflects the fact that petitioners in capital cases are
far more likely to be represented by counsel,22 ' as well as
heightened constitutional requirements for capital sentencing.
Many observers have speculated, however, that federal judges
follow an unstated practice of reviewing claims of error in capital
cases more strictly, sometimes "bending" procedural limits to

As to reputation, whatever one thinks of AEDPA's specific provisions, it expressly sought
to make the death penalty more "effective" by restricting collateral review, and it
commanded broad bipartisan support before being signed into law by President Bill
Clinton. It is difficult to accept the suggestion that the public is indifferent to the
execution of legally authorized death sentences, provided the offender remains in prison.
224. See Goldstein, supra note 220, at 397; Metzler, supra note 220, at 180-82.
225. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993) (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
226. KING ET AL., supra note 26, at 51-52.
227. Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers' Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury
Involvement in HabeasAdjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 904 (2010).
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permit consideration of a habeas petition on the merits.2 28
Although transparency about that practice would be preferable,
there are good reasons to single out capital sentences for
categorically different treatment on collateral review.
Second, Professor Russell and others have urged that
collateral challenges to federal sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
implicate diminished finality interests. 229 From a resource
standpoint, the duplication of effort is less acute in the federal
system because a federal prisoner need not exhaust available state
court remedies before pursuing postconviction relief.23 0 For the
same reason, federal postconviction claims can be resolved much
faster than habeas claims by state prisoners, reducing the risk of
inaccuracy at a new proceeding due to unavailable witnesses or
faded memories.2 3 1 In addition, as noted above in reference to
Begay claims, in federal court the same judge and attorneys who
handled the original sentencing typically handle the § 2255
motion, and their familiarity with the case should make
resentencing more straightforward and efficient.232
Again, however, the argument that federal sentences
should be treated differently is only partly grounded in finality.
The principal contention is that limits on collateral review reflect
federalism and comity concerns specific to habeas review of state
court judgments, and that those concerns are absent in federal
postconviction proceedings.2 3 3 In the retroactivity context, at least,
that claim is vulnerable to criticism: it overstates the importance of
federalism reasoning to the Teague framework, 234 and it
misunderstands how identical standards for collateral review of
state and federal judgments can be seen as an expression of

228. Cf. Russell, supra note 7.
229. Id. at 162 n.506.
230. Id. at 147.
231. See id. at 152 (discussing stale evidence).
232. See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
233. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 184 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(urging that the absence of comity concerns in § 2255 cases justifies a different "cause and
prejudice" standard for collateral review); Russell, supra note 7, at 146 ("Courts and
scholars often cite concerns about comity and federalism when emphasizing the
importance of finality of criminal judgments."). But see Amsterdam, supra note 19, at 37981 (urging the opposite distinction between state and federal prisoners, for purposes of
collateral review, on the ground that federal prisoners receive a federal forum to resolve
their constitutional claims "from the start").
234. See supra Part.I.B.
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respect, rather than disrespect, for state court proceedings.23 5
Consistent with Justice Harlan's view,23 6 the lower courts uniformly
have held that Teague applies with equal force to federal
postconviction motions under § 2255, and in dictum the Supreme
Court appears to have endorsed that practice.2 37 Nonetheless, in
principle, collateral review of federal judgments by federal courts
(and, for that matter, postconviction review of state judgments by
state courts) differs in important ways from habeas corpus review,
making it appropriate to consider different limits on collateral
review in that context.2 38
Carving out broad categories of sentences for distinct
treatment would add some complexity to courts' tasks on
collateral review, but it would avoid the grave workability
challenges of a case-by-case balancing approach. Courts could
establish a distinct set of rules for various limits on collateral
review-in essence a lower "tier of scrutiny"-and could easily
determine based on the type of sentence whether to apply it.

235. SeeJudith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 915 (1984) (explaining that the
Court's decision "to conform its interpretation of section 2255 to its rules for habeas
corpus petitions filed by state prisoners might be understood as embracing federalism,"
which "may simply oblige federal courts to accord equal deference to federal and state
court judgments").
236. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 681-82 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I
do not propose to make any distinction, for retroactivity purposes, between state and
federal prisoners seeking collateral relief. . . .").
237. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 n.4, 281 n.16 (2008) (noting
that lower courts have applied Teague to federal postconviction motions and that " [m] uch
of the reasoning applicable to applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to §
2254 seems equally applicable in the context of § 2255 motions," but that the question was
not present in the case); Duncan v. United States, 552 F.3d 442, 444 n.2 (6th Cir. 2009);
In re Fashina, 486 F.3d 1300, 1303-04 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d
278, 288 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2005);
Howard v. United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Jenkins, 333 F.3d 151, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282
F.3d 664, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2002); Daniels v. United States, 254 F.3d 1180, 1194 (10th Cir.
2001) (en banc); Jarrett v. United States, 266 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Martinez, 139 F.3d 412, 416 (4th Cir. 1998); Van Daalwyk v. United States, 21 F.3d 179,
183 (7th Cir. 1994); Gilberti v. United States, 917 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1990).
238. See Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2011)
(expressing doubt, in light of Danforth, about whether Teague applies to collateral attacks
under § 2255); Duncan 552 F.3d at 444 n.2 (applying Teague to a sentencing challenge
under § 2255, but expressing reservations "because many of the comity and federalism
concerns animating Teague are lacking"); Valentine v. United States, 488 F.3d 325, 341-42
& n.3 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 328 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court's opinion had nothing to do with
§ 2255 petitions).
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Within those categories, no further effort would be made to
ascertain case specific finality interests and to make doctrinal
adjustments accordingly. That would spare collateral review courts
the need to speculate about the finality interests at stake in
individual cases, while avoiding the complexity and indeterminacy
of infinitely variable habeas standards. 239 Without attempting a
complete catalogue of types of sentences that might warrant
categorically different treatment, it is enough to note that a
category-based approach shows more promise than either a
separate set of rules for all sentences or a case-by-case balancing of
finality interests.
Under an approach that carves out some categories of
sentences for separate treatment, sentences of life without the
possibility of parole, at issue in Miller, would be strong candidates.
The Court already has drawn parallels between capital sentences
and life without parole sentences for Eighth Amendment
purposes, first in Graham v. Florida240 and subsequently in Miller.241
A raft of scholarship has emerged developing that comparison and
urging that life without parole sentences implicate similar
considerations. 24 2 Much of the public attention to the retroactivity
Miller results not from strongly-held views about the finality
interests at stake, but from a sense that it is unfair for any juvenile
offender to serve a sentence so severe that they will die in
prison. 243 Making that distinction explicit would be preferable to
stretching existing Teague exceptions beyond recognition.
D. Finalityand Miller
It may come as a surprise, in light of the above defense of
finality, that I earnestly hope that Miller in some way affects all of
the more than two thousand sentences imposed in violation of the
rule but which became final before the decision. As a matter of
justice, every juvenile offender serving a mandatory sentence of
239. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644, 646 (1987) (declining to adopt a
case-by-case approach in the qualified immunity context).
240. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2009).
241. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012).
242.

For an overview,

see

WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA'S

NEW DEATH PENALTY?

(CharlesJ. Ogletree & Austin Sarat eds., 2012).
243. See, e.g., Jody Kent Lavy, Give Them Another Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roonifordebate/2013/09/18/reconsidering-young-lifers-sente
nces.
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life without parole deserves an opportunity to request
resentencing or parole. But the public debate about the
retroactivity of Miller powerfully illustrates the ineffectiveness of
collateral review in achieving that end.24 4
As noted above, the legislatures of five states-California,
Delaware, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Wyoming-already have
enacted "Miller fix" legislation that expressly applies retroactively
to cases that became final before the decision. 245 That
achievement, wholly separate from the collateral review process,
has granted parole or an opportunity for resentencing to more
than six hundred juvenile offenders sentenced to life without
parole. 246 At the same time, the variety of Miller "fixes" chosen by
state legislatures highlights the advantages of legislative, rather
than judicial, resolution of retroactivity questions. Many states
have granted offenders a right to seek resentencing or parole, but
they differ as to the timing (after fifteen years in California, after
forty years in Texas),247 the identity of the decisionmaker (a parole
board in Louisiana, a sentencing court in Delaware), 248 the
frequency of review (annually in Nebraska, discretionary in
others) ,249 and statutory exceptions (torturers in California,

244. Cf. William Baude, The Problem with Retroactivity Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roonfordebate/2013/09/18/reconsidering-young-lifers-sent
ences (encouraging juvenile justice advocates not to "place their faith in federal courts,"
and noting that state postconviction procedures and executive clemency remain available
to address Miller issues).
245. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
246. See State Distributionof Youth Offenders ServingJuvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP),
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 (Oct. 2, 2009), availableat http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/related-material/updatedJLWOP10.09 final.pdf (reporting that 2,589 juvenile
offenders are serving life without parole sentences, including 265 in California, 335 in
Louisiana, and 44 in North Carolina).
247. See, e.g., 2013-3 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1170, 1171 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (2) (A) (i)-(ii)) (granting a right to petition for resentencing
after fifteen years, but excluding offenders who killed certain law enforcement personnel
or who tortured their victims); TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 508.145(b) (West 2012 & Supp.
2013) (granting eligibility of parole after forty years to those serving life sentences under
Section 12.31(a)(1) of the Penal Code); id. § 12.31(a)(1) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013)
(granting life with the possibility of parole for individuals who committed capital offenses
at younger than eighteen years of age).
248. See, e.g., 2013-3 Del Code. Ann. Adv. Legis Serv. 177, 178-79 (LexisNexis) (to be
codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d) (1)-(4)); 2013 La. Acts 239 (to be codified
at LA. REV. STAT. § 15:574.4(E) (2)), availableat http://www.legis.1a.gov/legis/ViewDocu
ment.aspx?d=857374&n=HB152%2OAct.
249. See, e.g., 2013-3 Del Code. Ann. Adv. Legis Serv. 177, 178-79 (LexisNexis) (to be
codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209A(d) (1)-
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prisoners who commit certain infractions in Wyoming).2so Other
states, like South Dakota, afford only a one-time resentencing
procedure at which the judge has discretion to impose any
sentence, including life imprisonment.2 1
Each of those changes solves the Miller problem. But each
fix also carries different costs, reflects different state
commitments, and produces a different mix of winners and losers.
Offenders with especially compelling cases, for example, might
prefer a single immediate resentencing hearing, rather than a
long wait for parole eligibility. Other offenders, however, likely
would receive another life without parole sentence if the hearing
took place immediately, and would benefit more from automatic
parole eligibility in the future. Legislatures are better situated than
courts-especially federal courts engaged in collateral review of
state court judgments-to assess those costs and to select an
appropriate Miller remedy.
Collateral review is also an inappropriate mechanism for
securing resentencing under Miller because of its deterrent
purpose.25 2 Many prisoners now seeking the benefit of Millerwere
sentenced before Roper v. Simmon 25 3 in 2005, at a time when states
were free to sentence juvenile offenders to death. Ironically, many
offenders now challenging their sentences under Miller no doubt
initially welcomed a sentence of life without parole as an act of
mercy, even if it was a mandatory alternative to a capital sentence.
In fact, the frequency with which state courts chose life without
parole, rather than death, contributed to the "national consensus"
that prompted the Court in Roper to strike down the death penalty

(3)) (discretionary) (granting discretion to the court to set differing amounts of time in
between judicial review of a juvenile's life sentence); L.B. 44, 103d Leg. (Neb. 2013) (to
be codified as NEB. REV. STAT. 83-1,110.04), available at http://www.leg.ne.gov/FloorDocs
/Current/PDF/Slip/LB44.pdf.
250. 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1170, 1171 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(d) (2) (A) (i)-(ii)) (granting a right to petition for resentencing after fifteen
years, but excluding offenders who killed certain law enforcement personnel or who
tortured their victims); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301 (2013) (excepting offenders who
commit violations of WYO. STAT.

§

7-13-402(b) from parole eligibility); id.

§

7-13-402(b)

(2013) (stating that offenders who commit assault with a deadly weapon or escape are
ineligible for parole).
251. See S.B. 39, 89th Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2013) (to be codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-6-1), availableat http://www.legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2013/Bills/SB39ENR.pdf.
252. See supra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
253. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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for juvenile offenders.2 54 It therefore seems strange, and more
than a little dishonest, to fault state trial courts for imposing cruel
and unusual punishment by violating procedural requirements
they could not possibly have anticipated. Juvenile offenders
serving sentences of life without parole deserve an opportunity for
resentencing or parole eligibility, but we should not pretend that
state courts require the discipline of collateral review to deter
future errors.
At the same time, for reasons unrelated to retroactivity law,
collateral review is simply unreliable as a means of effectuating
new rules like in Miller. Filing a petition for state postconviction
relief or federal habeas requires compliance with statutes of
limitations, procedural default rules, exhaustion requirements,
bars against successive petitions, and various other requirements.
All of those limits serve legitimate purposes in their own right. Yet
the prisoners seeking collateral review have no right to appointed
counsel, and the vast majority represent themselves pro se. Even if
collateral review courts were to relax all of those requirements
somewhat in Miller cases, a nontrivial number of prisoners would
see their collateral actions dismissed without review on the merits.
Collateral review simply is not designed to extend the benefits of a
new rule automatically to all prisoners affected.
V. CONCLUSION
Although this essay has undertaken a defense of finality in
sentencing on collateral review, it would be misleading to divide
the judges and scholars who address finality into "attackers" and
"defenders." No defender considers finality interests so weighty as
to foreclose collateral review of sentences altogether. No attacker
considers finality interests so trivial that every offender should be
entitled to, say, automatic resentencing every month. Where they
disagree, it is only about the relative importance of finality and
competing interests, and about the proper rules to operationalize
that balance.
Some scholars propose a distinction, for finality purposes,
between sentences and convictions. In its strong form, the
argument is that all sentences implicate diminished finality
interests, and therefore should be evaluated under relaxed
254.

Id. at 567.

230

WAKE FORESTJOURNAL OFLAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:1

standards on collateral review. But each of the principal
justifications for existing limits on collateral review-the costs of
relitigation, the risk of inaccuracy at new proceedings, and the
threat to the reputation of the criminal justice system-applies
with equal force to collateral attacks on sentences. If the current
regime strikes a sensible balance for attacks on convictions, it is
appropriate for attacks on sentences as well.
In its modest form, the argument is that particular
sentencing claims or cases implicate diminished finality interests,
and the rules for collateral review should be calibrated accordingly
on a case-by-case basis. Although the premise is sound, in practice
that approach would prove complex and indeterminate,
producing results that suffer from the appearance (and probably
the reality) of arbitrariness. It would also be in tension with the
deterrent purpose of collateral review. A more promising
approach would be to carve out broad categories of sentences,
such as capital sentences or federal sentences. That approach
could respond to important differences in the balance of finality
and other interests for certain kinds of sentences, while avoiding
the workability challenges of a rule-by-rule or case-by-case inquiry.

